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Abstract 
The dissertation examines three empirical questions in the U.S. beer industry. The effect of large 
container consumption has been well explored in other food categories. However, its effect has 
been ignored in the U.S. beer industry. Although authorities have been imposing different public 
policies to lower negative externality of excessive alcohol consumption, statistics still clearly 
provide evidence related to severity of this problem. Therefore, first manuscript studies the 
impact of large container beer purchases on alcohol-related accidents. The study finds a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between large container beer purchases and 
alcohol-related accidents. Approximately 90% of the alcohol consumption by youth is in the 
form of binge drinking. Thus, second manuscript examines the impact of an unanticipated 
determinate of binge drinking behavior, minimum wage laws. The study finds a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between minimum wage increases and binge drinking 
among youth population. Third manuscript focuses on industry structure of the beer industry. 
There are many studies focusing on the impact of product variety on different outcome variables. 
Nonetheless, there is no study aiming to explore the impact of product depth on demand or 
supply side. In particular, the study examines the effect of product depth on market demand. 
Results suggest that an optimal product line depth for beer firms might be to provide more 
package size options than container size options.
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Chapter 1: The Impact of Large Container Beer Purchases on Alcohol-Related Fatal Vehicle 
Accidents 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a fixed effect weighted least square model, we examine how changes in the share of beer 
purchases from large containers (>12oz) impact alcohol-related fatal accidents. We find that, 
after holding beer purchases and overall alcohol-consumption constant, an increase in total beer 
purchases from containers greater than the standard size of 12 oz. increases alcohol-related fatal 
accidents. We confirm our results persist across several investigations of robustness, as well as 
the use of instrument variables methods. Outcomes suggest that policy makers should consider 
differential excise taxes for the purchase of larger than standard size beer containers. Such a 
policy would likely reduce the number of alcohol-related fatal vehicle crashes and help to 
internalize the negative externalities associated with drunk driving. At the very minimum, these 
results suggest that individuals prone to dangerous levels of drunk driving are the consumers that 
most prefer large container size consumption. This is consistent with the idea that binge drinkers 
and beer drinkers are much more likely to drive while legally intoxicated. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Excessive alcohol consumption has well-known adverse consequences, such as alcohol-
related fatal accidents, diseases, injuries, crime, and violence. Given that many of the behaviors 
related to excessive alcohol consumption have negative externalities, curbing such behavior has 
meaningful social benefits. Consequently, there are various regulations imposed by the authorities 
to lower excessive alcohol consumption, such as excise taxes, Minimum Legal Drinking Age 
(MLDA) Laws, maximum Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) thresholds, hours of sale etc.  
Of particular note, Levitt and Porter (2001) have shown that the negative externalities 
associated with drunk driving are quite high ($0.30 per mile driven while intoxicated). Statistics 
show that there were 9,878 fatalities in alcohol-related accidents, 31 percent of total traffic 
fatalities in 2011 in the U.S. (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2013).  Although 
authorities have been trying to mitigate this social problem by imposing various policies, there is 
still a need for further examination of the underlying determinates of drunk driving. Understanding 
what behaviors impact these negative outcomes and how individuals are best incentivized to 
prevent drunk driving is important to designing optimal public policy. 
In this study we explore one unnoticed and potentially important factor affecting consumer 
behavior of alcohol; beer container sizes. In particular, we aim to examine the relationship between 
beer container size and alcohol-related fatal accidents. There are many studies discussing the 
impacts of policies aiming at reducing drunk driving. However, to our knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate the relationship between beer container size purchases and the alcohol-related 
fatal accidents.  
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Unlike wine and liquor, which are typically consumed by the glass and have a greater shelf 
life after opened, beer is typically packaged and consumed in serving size containers (e.g. can or 
bottle). This difference is largely a function of the much shorter time period for which consumption 
of beer is optimal after opening. In recent years beer manufactures have begun to market beer in 
larger than standard (12 oz.) containers at a cheaper price per unit (ounce). The combination of the 
lower per unit price, larger container size, and a short consumption window after opening, may 
cause people to consume alcohol more quickly, or in greater quantities, or both.  Hence, 
consumption of beer in larger container sizes may lead to greater average levels of intoxication 
and, subsequently, an increase in alcohol-related fatal vehicle accidents. 
To investigate this issue we utilize data from two principle data sources, the Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (FARS), which comprises detailed information about all fatal 
accidents in the U.S., and the Nielsen scanner panel data, which provides data on alcohol purchases 
from retail outlets. Empirically we employ a weighted least squares (WLS) fixed-effects model 
specification. Our results are consistent with the concern outlined above, as we observe an increase 
in alcohol-related fatal accidents in locations with increased sales of larger beer containers. In 
particular, we find that a 10% increase in beer purchases in containers greater than 12 oz. increases 
the number of alcohol-related fatal accidents by 1.95%. Additionally, a 10% increase in beer 
purchases in containers greater than 18 oz. increases the number of alcohol-related fatal accidents 
by 2.24%.  
As we will demonstrate below, these estimates are robust to the inclusion of controls for 
area and time fixed effects, changes in population, and changes in factors that may influence 
overall driving risk separate from drinking behavior (e.g. construction, weather, etc.). Furthermore, 
 4 
 
these estimates are also robust to the estimation method selected (e.g., IV, weighted IV, ordinary 
least squares, negative binomial, etc).   
Ultimately, this finding provides further insight into how uniform alcohol taxation may 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Specifically, it suggests that differential beer tax rates based on the 
size of the container might lead to improved social outcomes. According to the National Institute 
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and several papers on the topic (e.g. Ruhm, 1996 ; Adams et 
al., 2012), beer taxes have a considerable impact on alcohol-related fatality rates, so policy makers 
should consider imposing different excises tax on beer purchases based on container size. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background of the regulations imposed 
to lower negative externality of excessive drinking, including a review of the literature on this 
issue. Section 3 explains our analysis of impact of large container beer purchases on alcohol-
related fatal accidents in addition to explanations provided for the two data sources used. Results 
and implications are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
1.2 Background 
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) an alcohol-
related fatality occurred every 53 minutes in 2011 (a year with a very low number of accidents due 
to the recession). Moreover, Levitt and Porter (2001) show that drunk drivers impose an externality 
per mile driven of at least 30 cents because of their greater likelihood of causing fatal accidents. 
Additionally, total cost of alcohol-related accidents was estimated as $51.1 billion in 2000 (Blincoe 
L, et al., 2000).   
The first notable attempt to reduce impaired driving in the U.S. was implemented in 1910 
by the state of New York, which passed a formal impaired driving law (Fell and Voas, 2006). As 
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automobile usage increased dramatically over the following decades, the costs associated with 
drunk-driving fatalities rose as well. In 1968 the National Highway Safety Bureau (now the 
NHTSA) reported formal and public concern relating to alcohol-impaired driving to Congress. 
Subsequently, over the last 40 years, governments at all levels have employed policy measures to 
curb drunk driving behavior, such as a range of alcohol taxes, age restrictions for consumption, 
blood alcohol limits while driving, sobriety check points, programs to educate the drivers, hours 
of sale, etc. Most of the existing research on the topic has focused on the impact of these regulations 
on the fatal accident rate.  
As well explored in Tremblay and Tremblay (2005), firms in the beer industry differentiate 
their products along with objective, subjective, horizontal and vertical dimensions to protect 
themselves from direct price competition. Brewers not only apply vertical differentiation (e.g. 
freshness of a product) but also horizontal differentiation (e.g. light beer versus dark beer). Firms 
in beer industry, in addition to vertical and horizontal differentiation, also increase their product 
variety with different package and container sizes. The packaging varieties have been changing 
including different containers with different sizes, with much of change being in the form of larger 
than the standard 12oz container (Corey M. Reardon, 2004).  This gives firms the ability to increase 
their profit and also discriminate price with different container and package sizes (cheaper per 
ounce prices) to extract more consumer surplus. However, this variation in package sizes alone 
may create larger negative consequences from the consumption of beer. 
While previous studies on drunk driving have not focused on the consequences of beer 
container size, the impact of container size on consumption has been well explored in different 
food categories. For example, Wansink and Kim (2005) conducted an experiment which shows 
that people at a movie theater eat 45.3% more popcorn, when they are given popcorn in large 
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containers. Additionally, in order to understand if this result is still valid regardless of the taste of 
popcorn, they provide the respondents with popcorn which is stale and of lower quality. 
Nevertheless, people still consume 33.6% more popcorn than the amount they did of fresh popcorn 
in standard size containers. Collectively these results indicate that large containers lead to 
overeating. Moreover, experiments done by Marchiori et al. (2012) on snack consumption also 
show that larger container size increases the food intake, in this case by 129%. Consistent with 
these findings, researchers and health organizations recommend using smaller containers in order 
to improve health outcomes.1 These findings and recommendations would suggest that increased 
beer container size may lead to increased consumption, all else equal. 
Studies that have focused specifically on alcohol demonstrate that many consumers prefer 
larger container sizes. According to an experiment conducted by Kaskutas and Graves (2000), 
individuals were shown the alcohol drinks with different sizes, and 48% of the respondent’s 
preferred container size was greater than 12 oz. standard size. Moreover, larger container sizes 
may lead to increased pace of consumption, perhaps as consumers attempt to finish their beer 
before it gets warm or flat. If common, such behavior would increase average blood alcohol 
content levels. The result of increased consumption pace is sensible if one considers the Windmark 
formula used by National Traffic Safety Administration to estimate BAC; 
EBAC = (0.806 * SD)/(BW * Wt) – (MR * DP) 
SD is the number of standard drinks; BW is the body water constant; Wt is the body weight 
and MR is the metabolism rate. DP is the drinking period, number of hours an individual drink a 
certain amount of alcohol. Clearly, an increase in DP would give a lower BAC threshold whereas 
                                                          
1 National Institutes of Health, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (1999); Department of Agriculture, Center 
for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (2002). 
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a lower DP, shorter period of time, would result in the opposite. Additionally, given the average 
human liver can only process approximately one drink in an hour,2 faster consumption or larger 
amounts of consumption (both possible outcomes of larger container size) will cause increased 
levels of inebriation.3  
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate whether these related outcomes translate to 
increased fatal vehicle accidents by observing alcohol purchase behavior. We find substantial 
evidence that the number of fatal accidents involving alcohol increases as the share of beer 
purchases of larger than standard containers increases.  
1.3 Data and Methods 
A. Data Sources 
To examine how changes in the share of beer purchases from large containers impacts alcohol-
related fatal accidents we utilize two primary data sources. First, the Nielsen Scanner Database 
(NSD) obtained from the Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy (the Food Marketing Policy 
Center) at the University of Connecticut, which provides detailed information on beer purchases, 
brands, container sizes, etc. of purchases in a series of locations across the US, and is designed to 
provide a representative sample of purchase habits for different locations across the U.S. 
Specifically, the NSD data are aggregated by Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMA), which are 
the geographic areas defined by Nielsen Media Research Company as a group of counties that 
make up a particular retail marketplace. The frequency of observation is rolling four week blocks 
(which we will often refer to as “monthly” for simplicity) from 2008 and 2011, and covers the 
                                                          
2 Prevention Resource Guide: Impaired Driving (1991) MS434 Safer Streets Ahead (1990) PH292. 
3 National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. 
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following twelve marketplaces: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Hartford, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York, San Francisco, Seattle and Syracuse.  
Of primary interest is the monthly amount of both total beer purchases in ounces in a DMA 
and total beer purchases in a DMA from large containers. Given that 12 fluid ounces is the standard 
size container for beer, we define containers (bottle or can) greater than 12 ounces as large, 
although we will also define containers of greater than 18 fluid ounces as large in certain 
specifications to demonstrate consistency in our findings.4  
       Table A1 (in the Appendix) displays the distribution of sizes of individual containers present 
in the data, by package, brand, and/or container type. Thus, for instance, Table A1 shows that there 
are 395 versions of beer products (e.g. Budweiser six-pack cans, Budweiser twelve pack bottles, 
Miller six-pack cans, etc.) where the base container size (e.g. can, bottle) was seven ounces. About 
27% of the variety in package, brand, size, and container type combinations includes beer products 
of greater than 12 ounces. As we capture monthly quantities sold for each type of beer products 
from Nielsen Scanner Data by each DMAs, we aggregate the quantities to find total beer purchases 
in ounces and our variables of interest. 
        We link NSD data on DMA-level beer purchases with fatal vehicle crash data obtained from 
the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) maintained by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA). The FARS provides a near census of fatal automobile accidents 
in the US, and is designed to track patterns in accident rates across the country. It provides detailed 
information about the driver and the accident, which will allow us to identify the time and location 
of all accidents, as well as the blood alcohol content of the drivers, so that alcohol-related accident 
                                                          
4 Total beer purchases of containers greater than 12 ounces and 18 ounces are highly correlated with total beer 
purchases (r=0.90), as one would anticipate. 
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counts can be identified separately.5 Hence, the dependent variable in our analysis will be the 
number of fatal accidents in a DMA-time period in which at least one driver has a blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) greater than 0.6 We will also utilize the number of non-alcohol-related 
accidents (BAC=0) in an area as an important control, which we discuss below.  
In addition to data from the NSD and the FARS, we also include data from other sources in 
our models. These include data total alcohol consumption from beer, wine and spirits collectively, 
which was obtained from National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism,7 and annual 
population of each DMA, available by aggregating county population data from the US Census 
Bureau. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variables form as used in the estimation 
process.8  
B. Empirical Methodology  
 Our basic empirical strategy is given by the following specification: 
Ln(Accidentsitw)= β0 + β1Ln(Container12itw) + β2Ln(Nobacitw) + β3Ln(BeerPurchasestw) +  
β4 Ln(Populationit) + β5Ln(AlcoholConsumptionitw)+ β6Ttw + β7Li + β8Ttw Li + Ɛitw                     (1) 
where subscript i denotes the DMA, t denotes year and w denotes a particular four-week period of 
a year (e.g. first, second, etc.). The terms Ttw and Li are time and the DMA fixed effects. The 
inclusion of fixed effects is vital in this context and helps alleviate one major concern of this 
analysis—specifically, capturing differences in accidents across DMA that are time-invariant and 
                                                          
5 Although required by law, BAC levels are not collected for every crash, hence the standard practice of using the 
NHTSA imputed BAC for missing observations that is provided in the FARS dataset is employed here (Klein, 1986; 
NHTSA, 2002; Rubin et al., 1998). 
6 Aggregation is designed to match the four week rolling blocks that are provided in the NSD. 
7 http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance97/tab3-1_11.htm. 
8 Appendix Table A2 provides break outs of the annual variation in total beer purchases from large container 
(>12oz) for each DMA in the sample. 
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differences in accidents across time that are common in all DMAs. Ttw Li denotes controls for time 
varying effects by DMA, which will account for potential differences in uncaptured trends across 
locations. 
Our dependent variable, Ln(Accidentsitw), is the log of total number alcohol-related fatal 
accidents in which  the driver has a BAC level greater than 0 in a given DMA-year-month cell. 
We judge logs to be the most appropriate measure of the dependent variable because the median 
estimated number of fatal accidents for a DMA-month in the sample is less than the mean.9 We 
show later that redefining the dependent variable or using a different estimation model yields 
qualitatively identical results.10 
Our principle variable of interest is the log of Container12itw, total beer purchases of 
containers greater than 12 ounces. Twelve ounce containers are considered standard in the industry 
as they are overwhelmingly the most common container size purchased in the market. This is also 
the clinically accepted measure for “one drink” when consuming beer. So, β1 represents the 
percentage change in alcohol-related accidents with respect to ounces of beer purchased from large 
container size. Note, we are also controlling for total beer purchases (BeerPurchasesitw) and overall 
alcohol consumption (AlcoholConsumptionitw) from all alcohol types and sources (not just retail 
purchases). These measures will account for changes in overall alcohol consumption habits in a 
DMA, and will also capture the impact of related public policies that may impact alcohol purchases 
habits (both in retail stores or at bars and restaurants) and might change during the time period 
                                                          
9 Given that the number of accidents may be highly variable in smaller DMAs, in certain specifications we will weigh 
the OLS estimates by DMA-time period population. We also correct all standard errors to allow for non-independence 
of observations from the same DMA through clustering. This follows the work of Arellano (1987) and Bertrand et al. 
(2004). That said, given that we have a smaller number of clusters we also use the bootstrap approach outlines by 
Cameron et al. (2008) and verify that our results are still robust.  
10 For example, Poisson, Negative Binomial, etc. 
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under investigation, such as beer taxes or dram shop laws. Hence, changes in Container12 reflect 
effects from changes in the distribution of alcohol purchases between small/standard (<=12 oz) 
and large container size (>12 oz).   
We understand that our empirical strategy must isolate the impact of changes in the share 
of large container size purchases aside from the other determinants of alcohol-related accidents. 
Our empirical approach addresses this in a number of ways. Specifically, we recognize that, while 
the DMA fixed effects capture differences in DMA that might affect accidents and are constant 
over time, we also should add various covariates that capture DMA-specific changes in a DMA’s 
alcohol-related crashes over time. The first control we include is the log of the DMA’s population 
obtained from the US Census Bureau, as population growth will likely increase accidents.  The 
non-alcohol-related fatal crashes are included to summarize time-varying attributes that influence 
overall crash risk across locations, e.g., gas prices, miles driven, general economic activity, 
highway construction, and weather patterns. This is an important independent variable, as it 
parsimoniously controls for both observed and unobserved characteristics that influence crash risk, 
and thus is expected to be positively related to fluctuations in the alcohol-impaired fatal crash rate 
(Adams & Cotti, 2008). 
The identification strategy explained to this point is predicated on the assumption that after 
controlling for fixed effects and time varying controls, total beer purchases and total alcohol 
consumption, we can estimate the impact of changes in the share of large container beer purchases 
on alcohol-related accidents. However, we have treated our variable of interest, Container12, as 
exogenous in our study. Given that purchase selection exists, this assumption might not be correct; 
consumer choice in container size may be correlated with other factors which are not observable 
by the researcher. We attempt to account for the presence of this possible endogeneity problem by 
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also estimating an Instrumental Variables (IV) model. Specifically, we use lags of the variable of 
interest as an instrument. Results (provided below) are robust. Moreover, the Hausman test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that DMA-level beer purchases from large container cans and bottles 
are exogenous.  
1.4 Empirical Results 
A. Basic Outcomes 
We are interested in identifying if an increase in the distribution of beer purchases toward 
larger container purchases results in a rise in alcohol-related fatal accidents. Column (1) of Table 
2 displays the outcomes from our basic WLS estimation of equation (1). Estimates are positive 
and highly statistically significant (P-Value=0.001), suggesting that, after holding total beer 
purchases and overall alcohol consumption constant, a 10% increase in total beer purchases of 
containers greater than 12 ounces rises alcohol-related fatal accidents by 1.95%.11 Given the 
average number of accidents by DMAs in our sample in 183.17 per year, this translates to an 
overall increase approximately 3.6 more alcohol-related fatal accidents in a year for the average 
DMA.12   
For robustness, in column (2) the variable of interest is redefined as Container18 (50% greater 
than standard size), where large container is defined as greater than 18 fluid ounces of beer. Results 
                                                          
11 Results are robust to Poisson (Container12: Coefficient = 0.231, P-Value = 0.000, Standard Error = 0.059) and 
Negative Binomial (Container12: Coefficient = 0.231, P-Value = 0.000, Standard Error = 0.059). 
12 To the extent that there is measurement error in the data, that estimates presented in Table 2 may suffer from 
attenuation bias and be biased toward zero. 
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are consistent (P-Value=0.002) and a bit larger, as one would anticipate if container size plays a 
meaningful role in drunk driving outcomes.13  
Next, in the final two columns of Table 2, weighting is dropped, yielding similar outcomes. 
Taken at face value, these results such strongly that, all else equal, larger container size options 
lead to increased alcohol-related accidents, and possibly due to greater levels of intoxication 
caused by increased pace or amount of alcohol-consumption.  
The estimates for other independent variables tend to be as expected, with NoBAC (which 
captures general accident risk), Total Beer Purchase, and Total Alcohol Consumption all having a 
positive impact on alcohol-related fatal accidents. The one exception would be Population, which 
provides a very imprecisely measured negative coefficient. This is likely because most of the 
changes effected by population size of the states are captured through the aggregate beer purchase 
and alcohol consumption variables.  
Lastly we want to verify that our baseline results aren’t driven by outliers. Specifically, while 
the vast majority of purchases captured by Container12 comes from purchases from 13oz to 40oz 
in container size, there is a small component of off-premises (packaged) consumption that comes 
from greater than 500 oz containers (i.e. half barrels, etc.). As discussed in the introduction and 
background, a potential mechanism for how shifts in container sizes impact accident outcomes 
maybe driven by changes in patterns surrounding the consumption of individual-sized containers 
(e.g. cans/bottles). Hence, we want to verify that our results are not driven by variation in outliers, 
such as half-barrels, and robust to restriction to purchases of container sizes that at commonly for 
                                                          
13 Results are robust to Poisson (Container18: Coefficient = 0.24, P-Value = 0.000, Standard Error = 0.038) and 
Negative Binomial (Container18: Coefficient = 0.24, P-Value = 0.000, Standard Error = 0.038). Results are also 
robust to other cutoff levels (i.e. 13oz, 14oz, etc.) that are sensible for containers intended for individual 
consumption.  
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individual purposes. To facilitate this investigation we re-estimate our baseline model for two 
different definitions of “large container” purchases. First, we restrict our large container definition 
to containers between 12 and 41 ounces, which reflect purchases of containers larger than standard 
size (12 ounces) but still intended for individual consumption. Second, we alternatively restrict 
our large container definition to purchases greater than 40 ounces, which reflects purchases of 
containers that are typically not intended for individual consumption. Estimates of the impact of 
increases in purchases of beer in containers between 12 and 41 ounce on alcohol-related fatal 
accidents is basically the same as presented in Table 2 (Coef. = 0.204; P-value< 0.001). 
Conversely, purchases greater than 40 ounces yield no significant effect (Coef. = 0.013; P-value = 
0.177). Collectively this strongly suggests the baseline results are, indeed, driven by changes in 
beer purchases from larger individual-sized beer containers. 
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
An additional concern that one may have is that the results found in Table 2 might be 
hampered by endogeneity. Specifically, Container12 (total beer purchases of containers greater 
than 12 oz.) and Container18 (total beer purchases of containers greater than 18 oz.), might be 
potentially correlated with unobservable time-varying factors that impact or outcome of interest. 
To test the endogeneity problem directly, we conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for 
both variables, Container12 and Container18. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
variables are exogenous (P-Value=0.72 for Container12 and 0.71 for Container18). This suggests 
that variables can be treated as exogenous and, coupled with the nature of the empirical 
specification presented in equation (1), that omitted variable bias is not likely to confound the 
initial estimates meaningfully.  
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However, with the goal of being comprehensive, we undertake a formal instrumental 
variables analysis. This method requires that we identify an instrument which is correlated with 
the endogenous variable but not with the error term in the model. Importantly, given that we are 
using a fixed effects framework, we need to find an instrument variable which also varies over 
time. As if often the case, strong IV candidates are not available. The instrument we use is the 
value of Container12 lagged one period. The lagged variable is correlated with Container12, but 
should not be correlated with the number of alcohol-related accidents in the period in question. 
Specifically, changes in lagged measures of Container12 are unlikely to impact future period 
accident outcomes, as the impact of alcohol consumption on drunk driving is immediate in this 
context. That said, using lagged variables as instruments can be problematic and the results should 
be interpreted with caution, accordingly. Below we also provide information on the explicit set of 
tests deigned to verify the validity of this instrument.  
We utilize a two stage least squares approach where we estimate first stage by the following 
model: 
Ln(Container12itw)= β0 + β1(Ln(Container12it-1w))+β2Ln(Nobacitw) + β3Ln(BeerPurchasestw) + β4 
Ln(Populationit) + β5Ln(AlcoholConsumptionitw)+ β6Ttw + β7Li + β8Ttw Li + Ɛitw                         (2) 
where subscript i denotes the DMA, t denotes year and w denotes four-week periods. The terms 
Ttw and Li are time and the DMA fixed effects. Ttw Li denotes controls for time varying effects by 
DMA. Our principle variable of interest, the log of Container12itw is dependent variable in first 
stage regression. Total beer purchases (BeerPurchasesitw) and overall alcohol consumption 
(AlcoholConsumptionitw) are also included in the first stage regression. Nobacitw denotes non-
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alcohol-related fatal crashes and Ɛitw is the residual. We will also follow the same approach for our 
other variable of interest, Container18.  
The results of the first stage regression are given in Table A3 in the appendix. As the results 
show, the coefficients of the lag instrumental variable for both endogenous variables, Container12 
and Container18, are statistically significant at 1% level (P-Value=0.000). Importantly, results 
depict that an increase in lag value of our instrument would result in an increase in total beer 
purchases of larger containers. 
We also conduct an F-test to test the strength of the instrument. F-statistics show that we 
can reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument. In particular, the F-statistic for our endogenous 
variable, Container12, is 161.87 which is considerably greater than rule of thumb of ten. 
Additionally, we calculate the Stock and Yogo test which depicts the critical values for 2sls 
estimation. Since F-statistic, 161.87 is greater than 5% critical value of Wald test, 16.38, we reject 
the null hypothesis of weak instruments. F-statistic for our second endogenous variable, 
Container18, is 310.06. As this value exceeds both rule of thumb of 10 and 5% Wald test critical 
value, we again reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument. 
Table 3 depicts the second stage results. The first two columns of Table 3 provide the 
estimates of weighted IV approach, and the last two provide the same estimates, but unweighted. 
Outcomes from the IV approach are very similar to the WLS/OLS outcomes reported in Table 2, 
and in all cases support our earlier findings, as the variables of interest (Container12 and 
Container18) are still positive and statistically significant. 
As seen in column 1 of Table 3, coefficient of Container12 is 0.164 (P-Value=0.013) 
suggesting that a 10% increase in total beer purchases of containers greater than 12 ounces rises 
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fatal crashes by 1.64%, compared to 1.95% in the WLS model. Similarly, a 10% rise in 
Container18, total beer purchases of containers greater than 18 ounces brings 2.15% (P-
Value=0.061) increase in alcohol-related accidents compared to 2.24% in our basic specification. 
Furthermore, the third and fourth columns of Table 3 depict estimates of the unweighted IV model 
and are identical to our main results. Coefficient for Container12 and Container18 are still 
statistically significant (P-Value=0.001 and 0.03 respectively). 
1.5 Conclusion 
Heavy alcohol consumption is a severe problem not only for the authorities but also for 
society. It has both social and economic implications, including diseases, injuries, crime, violence, 
etc. In this study we focus on one of the important consequences of heavy drinking; alcohol-related 
fatal vehicle accidents. There were 9,878 fatalities in alcohol-related accidents in 2011. Estimated 
total cost of alcohol-related accidents was $51.1 billion in 2000 (Blincoe L, et al., 2000). Thus, 
this problem has not only social importance for the policy makers but also economic and 
behavioral implications which need to be fully understood. 
Unlike wine and liquor, which are typically consumed by the glass and have a greater shelf 
life after opened, beer is typically packaged and consumed in serving size containers (e.g. can, 
bottle, etc.). This difference is largely a function of the much shorter time period for which 
consumption of beer is optimal after opening. The combination of the lower per unit price 
associated with larger container size and short consumption window after opening may cause 
people to consume alcohol more quickly, or in greater quantities, or both.  Hence, consumption of 
beer in larger container sizes may lead to greater average levels of intoxication and, subsequently, 
an increase in alcohol-related fatal vehicle accidents. Even though the impact of container size on 
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consumption has been well explored in different food categories, its impact on beer consumption 
or drunk driving accidents has not been studied in detail.  
Our findings show that, after accounting for total beer purchases and overall alcohol 
consumption, an increase in beer purchases from larger than standard size containers is 
significantly associated with an increase in alcohol-related fatal accidents. Such an outcome 
suggests that policy makers should consider a beer tax based on the size of the containers, as it 
should lower the alcohol-related fatal crashes rate and help to internalize the negative externalities 
associated with drunk driving. At the very minimum, these results suggest that individuals prone 
to dangerous levels of drunk driving are the same people who most prefer large container size 
consumption. This is consistent with the idea that binge drinkers and beer drinkers are much more 
likely to drive while legally intoxicated (Cotti et al. 2014).  A limitation of our results is that 
Nielsen scanner panel data do not include purchases from restaurant and bars, thus are only 
explicitly relatable to off-premises purchases. However, to the extent that purchase habits at a point 
and time are correlated between on-premises and off-premises location, inference should be 
consistent.  
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TABLE 1. –  DMA LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Accidents (BAC>0) 624 14.09 8.11 0 50 
Accidents (BAC==0) 624 26.40 16.58 3 102 
Total Packaged Beer Purchases 
(in million ounces ) 624 109 87.4 11.5 461 
Population (in million) 624 8.1 5 1.9 20.3 
Total Alcohol Purchases- any 
source (in million ounces) 624 999 604 221 2,390 
Total Packaged Beer Purchases 
(>12 oz.) 624 12.6 12.2 0.243 60.1 
Total Packaged Beer Purchases 
(>18 oz.) 624 7.9 11.8 0.183 56.9 
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Table 2. WLS and OLS ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF FATAL 
ALCOHOL-RELATED ACCIDENTS 
  (1) (2) 
  
WLS with Transformed 
Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
OLS with Transformed  
Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Container12 0.195*** - 0.225*** - 
 (0.0444) - (0.069) - 
Container18 - 0.224*** - 0.236*** 
 - (0.0539) - (0.059) 
Non-Alcohol-Related 
Accidents 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.209*** 0.212*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0554) (0.062) (0.061) 
Beer Consumption 0.269 0.241 0.161 0.140 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.269) (0.254) 
Population -5.099 -4.768 -1.117 -0.853 
 (4.062) (3.669) (5.480) (5.087) 
Alcohol Consumption 5.017 4.806 3.982 3.837 
 (3.302) (3.035) (3.484) (3.246) 
Sample Size 624             624 624 624 
All regressions include both DMA and year fixed effects. The sample size is 624 observations come from 12 DMAs 
(Designated Market Areas), 4 years and 13 four months period in a year. Column 1 is estimated by weighted least 
squares using the log of total number alcohol-related fatal accidents in which the driver has a BAC level greater than 
0 in a given DMA-year-month cell as a dependent variable. Column 2 is also estimated by weighted least squares with 
a different variable of interest, , the total beer purchases of containers greater than 18 ounces. For both column 1 and 
2, weights are formed as population of a given DMA and time. Column 3 and 4 are estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The only difference between column 3 and 4 is the variable of interest used. While column 3 uses  the total beer 
purchases of containers greater than 12 ounces, as a variable of interest, column 4 uses  the total beer purchases of 
containers greater than 18 ounces. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the DMA level to allow for 
arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given DMA. *** denotes statistical 
significance at 1% level.  
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Table 3. IV ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF FATAL ALCOHOL-
RELATED ACCIDENTS 
  (1) (2) 
  Weighted IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Container12 0.164** - 0.207*** - 
 (0.066) - (0.064) - 
Container18 - 0.215* - 0.273** 
 - (0.115) - (0.126) 
Non-Alcohol-Related 
Accidents 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.055) (0.055) 
Beer Consumption 0.306** 0.264 0.186 0.122 
 (0.147) (0.167) (0.245) (0.266) 
Population -5.936* -5.505* -1.956 -1.350 
 (3.606) (3.234) (4.849) (4.459) 
Alcohol Consumption 5.495* 5.264* 4.41 4.149 
 (2.953) (2.694) (3.119) (2.849) 
Sample Size 612 612 612 612 
All regressions include both DMA and year fixed effects. The sample size is 612 observations come from 12 DMAs, 
4 years and 13 four months period in a year. Column 1 is estimated by weighted least squares with instrument variable 
using the log of total number alcohol-related fatal accidents in which the driver has a BAC level greater than 0 in a 
given DMA-year-month cell as a dependent variable. Instrument variable used is lag of the endogenous variable, total 
beer purchases of containers > 12 ounces. Column 2 is also estimated by weighted least squares with instrument 
variable. The variable of interest is different than the one in column 1;  total beer purchases of containers greater than 
18 ounces. Instrument variable is lag of the endogenous variable,  total beer purchases of containers > 12 ounces. For 
both column 1 and 2, weights are formed as population of a given DMA and time. Column 3 and 4 are estimated by 
instrument variable technique. The only difference between column 3 and 4 is the variable of interest used. While 
column 3 uses Container12, total beer purchases of containers greater than 12 ounces, as a variable of interest, column 
4 uses Contianer18. Instrument variables are the lags of the variables of interest. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered at the DMA level to allow for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over 
time in a given DMA. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Distribution of products in the data set in terms of ounces 
oz Freq. Percent Cum. 
7 395 1.36 1.36 
8 61 0.21 1.57 
8.5 2 0.01 1.58 
9 16 0.06 1.63 
9.4 1 0 1.63 
10 22 0.08 1.71 
10.1 1 0 1.71 
11 52 0.18 1.89 
11.15 131 0.45 2.34 
11.16 8 0.03 2.37 
11.2 1,785 6.14 8.51 
11.5 266 0.92 9.43 
11.6 2 0.01 9.43 
12 18,529 63.74 73.18 
12.5 13 0.04 73.22 
12.68 9 0.03 73.25 
12.7 57 0.2 73.45 
13 11 0.04 73.49 
14.9 50 0.17 73.66 
15.2 4 0.01 73.67 
16 1,585 5.45 79.12 
16.1 20 0.07 79.19 
16.9 1,161 3.99 83.19 
17 166 0.57 83.76 
18 10 0.03 83.79 
18.7 73 0.25 84.04 
19.25 5 0.02 84.06 
20.3 19 0.07 84.13 
21 3 0.01 84.14 
21.4 49 0.17 84.31 
21.6 56 0.19 84.5 
22 812 2.79 87.29 
22.3 13 0.04 87.34 
22.31 1 0 87.34 
22.4 48 0.17 87.51 
23.6 5 0.02 87.52 
24 1,617 5.56 93.09 
25 48 0.17 93.25 
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25.3 22 0.08 93.33 
25.35 28 0.1 93.42 
25.4 614 2.11 95.53 
26 14 0.05 95.58 
30.4 7 0.02 95.61 
32 384 1.32 96.93 
33.8 30 0.1 97.03 
33.82 2 0.01 97.04 
40 320 1.1 98.14 
46.5 12 0.04 98.18 
50.7 15 0.05 98.23 
51 9 0.03 98.26 
64 22 0.08 98.34 
66.56 3 0.01 98.35 
68 1 0 98.35 
101 4 0.01 98.37 
103 15 0.05 98.42 
106 2 0.01 98.42 
161.28 1 0 98.43 
166.4 10 0.03 98.46 
168.96 13 0.04 98.51 
169 155 0.53 99.04 
196 13 0.04 99.08 
499.2 4 0.01 99.1 
640 1 0 99.1 
660.48 6 0.02 99.12 
716.8 3 0.01 99.13 
992 54 0.19 99.32 
1690 13 0.04 99.36 
1984 168 0.58 99.94 
1985 1 0 99.94 
2016 7 0.02 99.97 
2048 9 0.03 100 
Total 29,068 100   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 26 
 
Table A2-Beer Purchases of Containers Greater than 12 and 18 Ounces by Year and DMA 
Year DMA Total Beer Purchases (>12 oz) Total Beer Purchases (>18 oz) 
2008 Atlanta                                        87,300,000                                                   25,200,000  
2009 Atlanta                                        89,400,000                                                   24,400,000  
2010 Atlanta                                      116,000,000                                                   33,200,000  
2011 Atlanta                                      135,000,000                                                   39,800,000  
2008 Boston                                        25,200,000                                                   12,100,000  
2009 Boston                                        27,700,000                                                   14,400,000  
2010 Boston                                        36,000,000                                                   20,500,000  
2011 Boston                                        42,000,000                                                   23,100,000  
2008 Chicago                                      168,000,000                                                   70,600,000  
2009 Chicago                                      162,000,000                                                   68,300,000  
2010 Chicago                                      166,000,000                                                   65,300,000  
2011 Chicago                                      169,000,000                                                   68,000,000  
2008 Dallas                                        96,000,000                                                   40,400,000  
2009 Dallas                                        81,100,000                                                   34,600,000  
2010 Dallas                                        73,400,000                                                   35,300,000  
2011 Dallas                                        87,200,000                                                   47,200,000  
2008 Detroit                                        59,800,000                                                   46,500,000  
2009 Detroit                                        50,600,000                                                   40,500,000  
2010 Detroit                                        85,700,000                                                   72,700,000  
2011 Detroit                                      108,000,000                                                   87,300,000  
2008 Hartford                                          4,707,883                                                     3,914,281  
2009 Hartford                                          4,507,285                                                     3,460,023  
2010 Hartford                                          5,492,463                                                     4,184,407  
2011 Hartford                                          5,928,426                                                     4,159,419  
2008 Los Angeles                                      550,000,000                                                532,000,000  
2009 Los Angeles                                      597,000,000                                                583,000,000  
2010 Los Angeles                                      612,000,000                                                590,000,000  
2011 Los Angeles                                      677,000,000                                                646,000,000  
2008 Miami                                      280,000,000                                                   47,600,000  
2009 Miami                                      299,000,000                                                   38,700,000  
2010 Miami                                      285,000,000                                                   41,000,000  
2011 Miami                                      245,000,000                                                   43,800,000  
2008 New York                                      138,000,000                                                107,000,000  
2009 New York                                      145,000,000                                                114,000,000  
2010 New York                                      156,000,000                                                123,000,000  
2011 New York                                      169,000,000                                                132,000,000  
2008 San Francisco                                      112,000,000                                                108,000,000  
2009 San Francisco                                      139,000,000                                                134,000,000  
2010 San Francisco                                      157,000,000                                                151,000,000  
2011 San Francisco                                      175,000,000                                                164,000,000  
2008 Seattle                                      220,000,000                                                   97,800,000  
2009 Seattle                                      248,000,000                                                   99,400,000  
2010 Seattle                                      263,000,000                                                103,000,000  
2011 Seattle                                      272,000,000                                                   92,300,000  
2008 Syracuse                                        41,800,000                                                   15,700,000  
2009 Syracuse                                        46,100,000                                                   16,400,000  
2010 Syracuse                                        54,900,000                                                   17,900,000  
2011 Syracuse                                        65,300,000                                                   23,500,000  
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Table A3. Estimates for First Stage Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
  
First Stage Regression of 
Container12 
First Stage Regression of 
Container18 
Non-Alcohol-Related 
Accidents 0.006 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.017) 
Beer Consumption 0.493*** 0.533*** 
 (0.152) (0.170) 
Population -3.077** -3.496* 
 (1.542) (1.945) 
Alcohol Consumption 0.868* 0.799 
 (0.504) (0.813) 
Lag of Container12 0.667*** - 
 (0.050) - 
Lag of Container18 - 0.672*** 
Sample Size 612 
(0.037) 
612 
All regressions include both DMA and year fixed effects. The sample size is 612 observations come from 12 DMAs, 
4 years and 13 four months period in a year. Column 1 is estimated by ordinary least squares using the log of total 
beer purchases of containers greater than 12 oz. given DMA-year-month cell as a dependent variable. Instrument 
variable used is one time lag of the endogenous variable, Container12. Column 2 is also estimated by ordinary least 
squares. The dependent variable is Container18, total beer purchases of containers greater than 18 ounces. Instrument 
variable is one time lag of the endogenous variable, Container 18. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered 
at the DMA level to allow for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given 
DMA. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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Chapter 2: Minimum Wages and Youth Binge Drinking 
 
 
Abstract 
Binge drinking is associated with many health problems, including unintentional injuries, 
intentional injuries (e.g., domestic violence, sexual assault), unintended pregnancy, liver disease, 
etc. Moreover, high-volume episodic binge drinking is very prevalent among teenagers and young 
adults. Given that approximately 90% of the alcohol consumed by youth under the age of 21 in the 
United States is in the form of binge drinking (Murphy et al., 2012), understanding the 
determinants of binge drinking behavior, particularly among youth, is important from the 
perspective of health and policy. In this paper, we explore the relationship between youth binge 
drinking and an unanticipated determinate of this behavior, minimum wage laws. Using a fixed 
effects regression model, we observe a positive relationship between minimum wage increases and 
binge drinking among teenagers. We find that, after accounting for demographic characteristics, 
different types of risky behaviors, excise tax, state and time fixed effects, and time varying state 
effects, a $1 increase in minimum wage increases binge drinking among teenagers by 
approximately 9%. Our results support recent findings that minimum wage increases are positively 
associated with alcohol related accidents among teenagers (Adam et al., 2012). Findings suggest 
that authorities should consider the unexpected impacts that minimum wage increase may have on 
alcohol consumption among teens, and consider parallel policies to help mitigate potential negative 
consequences.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Binge drinking, defined by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
(NIAAA) as “a pattern of drinking that brings a person’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to 
0.08 grams percent or above, and typically happens when men consume 5 or more drinks, and 
when women consume 4 or more drinks, in about 2 hours”, is associated with many health 
problems, including unintentional injuries (e.g., car crashes, falls, drowning), intentional injuries 
(e.g., domestic violence, sexual assault), unintended pregnancy, liver disease, etc. (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2014).  Moreover, high-volume episodic binge drinking is 
very prevalent among teenagers and young adults. Approximately 90% of the alcohol consumed 
by youth under the age of 21 in the United States is in the form of binge drinking (Murphy et al. 
2012; OJJDP (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2005). Hence, understanding 
the determinants of binge drinking behavior, particularly among youth, is important from the 
perspective of health and policy.  
Observed patterns of binge drinking behavior of youth, coupled with the fact that binge 
drinkers are 14 times more likely to engage in alcohol-impaired driving than non-binge drinkers 
(Naimi et al. 2003), suggest that vehicle crashes are a particularly costly consequence of this risky 
behavior. It is well known that motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of mortality among 
teenagers in the US (CDC 2013). According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
on average, seven teenagers were killed every day in motor vehicle crashes in 2010. Also, just as 
is the case with adults, alcohol plays an important role in this outcome. Teens are 17 times more 
likely to be in an accident when they are drunk versus sober (CDC 2012), and approximately one 
million teenagers drove while intoxicated in 2011 (CDC 2012). Consequently, even though all the 
states impose Minimum Legal Drinking Age Law (MLDA) to prevent teenagers to purchase 
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alcohol, these statistics show that teenage driving while intoxicated is still a severe problem in the 
United States.  
In this paper, we explore the relationship between youth binge drinking and an 
unanticipated determinate of this behavior, minimum wage laws. Previous researchers have often 
focused on the impact of policies aimed at reducing teenager drinking, such as MLDA (Wagenaar 
and Toomey 2002) and beer taxes (e.g. Ruhm 1996; Adams et al. 2012). However, given the 
significant percentage of teenagers that are impacted by minimum wages increases and recent 
research findings, it likely worthwhile to analyze how this seemingly unrelated policy may impact 
a teen’s willingness to consume high volumes of alcohol. In particular, a recent paper by Adams 
et al. (2012) in the Review of Economics and Statistics identified an unanticipated impact of 
minimum wage increases on alcohol-related crashes involving teenagers. Specifically, the Adams 
et al. paper demonstrates that higher real minimum wages, perhaps by influencing disposable 
income, increase alcohol-related accidents involving teenagers. The suggestion of the Adams et 
al. (2012) research is that increases in minimum wages lead to more alcohol consumption by 
teenagers, which subsequently translates into more auto fatalities. While the identification utilized 
in their paper is compelling, the actual drinking behavior of teens following minimum wage 
increases was not studied specifically. Given the nature of the relationship between alcohol-related 
driving and binge drinking behavior (referenced above), one would expect the positive association 
between minimum wages and drunk driving to be driven by binge drinking activity.  In this new 
paper we explicitly attempt to draw a clearer connection between minimum wage policy and teen 
alcohol consumption, in particular binge drinking. Using information on cross-state variation in 
minimum wages during the 1991-2011 period and individual level data from the National Youth 
Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), we implement a fixed effects regression design to identify if 
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changes in real minimum wages impact teen binge drinking. Our findings show that a $1 increase 
in the real minimum wage increases binge drinking on average by approximately 9% among teens 
14-18 years old. 
  Results are robust to the inclusion of time and state fixed effects, controls for age, 
education, race, ethnicity, the presence of other risky behaviors such as daily smoking habit and 
general alcohol consumption behavior, as well as state policy variation, such as beer taxes. 
Additionally, estimates separated by gender indicate that the primary effect is largely driven by 
behavioral changes among teenage males.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background of the impact of minimum 
wage on teenagers’ consumption habits, including a review of literature on this issue. Section 3 
explains the impact of an increase in minimum wage on binge drinking as well as information 
about the data sources used. While section 4 discusses the results, section 5 concludes.  
 
2.2 Background and Previous Literature 
There are many papers in the related literature which investigate the impact of government 
policies targeting alcohol consumption (e.g. MLDA (Wagenaar and Toomey 2002), blood alcohol 
content thresholds (Hingson, Heeren and Winter 2000), higher alcohol taxes (Ruhm, 1996; Adams et 
al. 2012) etc.) on alcohol consumption and drunk driving accidents among both teenagers and 
adults. Beer taxes, for example, have been shown to be effective at reducing automobile fatalities 
(e.g. Ruhm 1996), in particular among teens (Adams et al. 2012). This outcome is consistent with 
the extensive literature that has demonstrated that teens are more elastic to cigarette taxes than 
adults, as well as basic economic theory regarding elasticity and budget constraints. However, 
given that approximately 22%-25% of employed teens work at (or below) the minimum wage and 
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approximately another 30% work within a dollar more than the minimum wage, a meaningful 
percentage of teen incomes are potentially impacted by minimum wage increases as well (Current 
Population Study-ORG). Given that minimum wage increases would likely increase consumers’ 
consumption possibilities, and that this impact would be stronger among teenagers, the expectation 
is that an increase in minimum wage would lead to an increase in alcohol consumption and 
subsequently lead to more traffic fatalities. This impact is well examined in the aforementioned 
paper by Adams et al. (2012), which found that increases in real minimum wages increased 
alcohol-related accidents among teens.  
Nonetheless, the impact of minimum wages on alcohol consumption itself has not been 
well explored. Our current study examines this relationship, in particular the form of consumption 
most strongly linked to automobile fatalities, binge drinking. Given basic economic theory and the 
outcomes of related research, in particular Adams el al. (2012), we anticipate that a rise in the real 
minimum wage will increase binge drinking behavior among teenagers.  
Of course, this argument is somewhat dependent on the assumption that teen workers who 
remain employed after a minimum wage increase will get an increase in earnings, and, at the 
population level, these earnings increases will not be offset by employment losses, leaving the 
aggregate impact on teenagers improved. However, research on the employment effects of 
minimum wages often yields conflicting conclusions (see Card 1992; Card and Krueger 1994; 
Addison, Blackburn and Cotti 2009; Dube et al. 2010; Neumark and Wascher 2008), leaving this outcome 
somewhat uncertain. Adams et al. (2012) address this issue in detail, using the range of findings 
from the existing minimum wage employment literature to demonstrate that the effect of a $1 
increase in the minimum wage could impact aggregate teen income as little as a net zero change 
(if disemployment effects are large) to as much as an increase in millions of dollars per week in 
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average sized states (if estimated employment effects of minimum wages are near zero, which is 
often the case). Moreover, even in a scenario where disemployment effects are more sizable, 
minimum wages should still affect the distribution of income among teenagers in a way that would 
likely increase the likelihood of increased expenditures on alcohol, specifically if the marginal 
propensity to consume alcohol is particularly high for teenagers (which is likely).  
Furthermore, previous studies have shown a positive relationship between teenagers’ 
income and alcohol consumption. According to a survey conducted by National Center on 
Addiction and Substance Abuse (2003), a small increase in teen income lead to approximately a 
doubling alcohol drinking incidence among teenagers. Additionally, research on the issue by 
Markowitz and Tauras (2009) presents evidence that higher individual income – either due to 
allowances or earnings – is associated with increased use of alcohol among teenagers.  Conversely, 
other researchers have postulated that there may be an increase in teen consumption of alcohol due 
to stress/depression caused by job loss or due to their concerns about the possibility of losing their 
jobs in the future. This argument is supported by Arkes (2007) who finds that an increase in 
unemployment among teenagers leads to a rise in the number of days that they drink alcohol per 
month. Consequently, the overall impact of minimum wage increases may increase alcohol 
consumption regardless of the net employment effects. 
Building off of the relevant literature, our paper estimates how minimum wages affect 
binge drinking habits of teenagers. Given that minimum wage laws change over time and across 
states, we can use this variation to identify the effects of these policies broadly.   
 
 
 
 34 
 
2.3 Data and Methods 
Data Sources 
To explore the impact of minimum wage increase on alcohol consumption we utilize the 
national school-based Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) from 1991 to 2011, conducted by 
CDC. In particular, we utilize data from the years 1991, 1999, 2001 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 
2011. YRBS is an individual-level survey designed to monitor different types of risk behaviors 
(e.g. alcohol and drug use, tobacco use, unhealthy dietary behaviors, etc.) among U.S. children 14-
18 years of age engaging in full-time education. The survey is typically conducted every other 
year, comprises a national school-based survey, as well as state and local surveys, hence state-
level identifiers are available for most (46) states.14 In particular, our dependent variable of interest 
is a self-reported count of binge drinking in the past 30 days, defined as how many days a 
participant reported drinking more than five alcoholic beverages.  
The YRBS data also provide us with a rich set of demographic and behavioral controls to 
utilize in our empirical investigation. Specifically, we have information on participants’ age, 
gender, education year, race, ethnicity, and their responses for other risky behaviors, such as 
whether respondents have ever smoked or they smoke daily and how many days they have drunk 
alcohol in their life. These behavioral controls are very useful as they can help to account for 
unobserved differences in trends in the relative riskiness of certain teen populations that may not 
be captured by the model specification otherwise.  
There are a few important limitations of the using the YRBS data. First, there is no 
information on employment status or wages in the YRBS, so an examination of the effect of 
                                                          
14 YBRS provides a repeated cross-section of teens from different states over time, it does not provide repeated 
information on the same teens. 
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minimum wage increases on binge drinking separately for those teens employed and not employed 
or wage level is not possible. Second, because the YRBS is a survey of teens engaged in full-time 
education, there is the potential that selection bias may impact estimates if changes in the minimum 
wage affect the distribution of teenagers who are enrolled in school. Lastly, there may be 
measurement error, as we are asking teens to self-report illegal behaviors, which may meaningfully 
impact outcomes.    
We combine the YRBS data with minimum wage data for each state and year that we are 
able to match in our YRBS sample. Information on state minimum wage changes are reported in 
the January editions of the Monthly Labor Review. In the event the minimum wage is passed in the 
middle of a year, the new and old minimum wage levels are averaged based on the number of 
months of each year in effect. State level nominal minimum wages are reported in Appendix A. It 
is worth noting that among the 46 states in our sample, 17 states apply the Federal minimum wage, 
while 29 states had one or more changes in the state mandated minimum wage during our sample 
time frame. Nevertheless, given we are looking at real minimum wages, there is significant time 
and space variation available to us in the minimum wage policy variable, which can be utilized to 
identify the impact of minimum wages on binge drinking among youth. We also include excise 
tax for beer in each state-year to control for teenagers’ price sensitivity and any correlation between 
these policy changes and minimum wage changes that may confound our estimates. Data on beer 
taxes for each state were collected from the Federation of Tax Administrators web site. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics for the range of variables utilized in our estimation process.  Table 
2 and Table 3 provide the same information broken out by gender. 
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Empirical Methodology 
 In order to isolate the impact of minimum wage increase on binge drinking, we utilize 
an estimation strategy based on the following specification: 
Bingedrinkingitw = β0 + β1Minwagets + β2Ageits + β3Educationits + β4Genderits + β5Ethnicityits+ 
β6Raceits + β7Smokingdailyits + β8Smokingeverits + β9Alcohollifeits + β10Taxts + β11Tt + β12Ls + 
β13TtLs + Ɛits                                                                                                                                                                                        (1)               
where subscript i denotes individuals taking the survey, t denotes year and s denotes state. Tt  and 
Ls are the time and state fixed effects respectively. The inclusion of time and state fixed effects is 
important in our model as they allow us to control for persistent differences in binge drinking 
behavior across states which are time-invariant and differences in binge drinking habits that vary 
over time which are common in all the states. In addition, we include TtLs which accounts for 
potential differences in uncaptured state time trends across locations.  
Our dependent variable, Bingedrinkingitw, is the number of binge drinking events that each 
survey respondent reported undertaking in the last 30 days.  Our policy variable of interest is 
Minwagets, which is annual minimum wage for each state in 2011 dollars. Additionally, we control 
for individual specific demographics such as Ageits (age of the respondent), Educationits (year of 
education is 9, 10, 11, 12), Genderits (male or female), Ethnicityits (hispanic or not), Raceits (white, 
black, or other). Hence, β1 reports the marginal impact of a minimum wage increase on teenage 
binge drinking.  
We understand that our empirical strategy must isolate the impact of a minimum wage 
increase on binge drinking aside from the other determinants of binge drinking. Hence, we also 
include measures of other risky behaviors, such as Smokingdailyits (whether they smoke every day 
or not), Smokingeverits (whether they have smoked ever or not), Alcohollifeits (how many days they 
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have drunk in their life), to account for differences across individuals in their natural tendency to 
engage in risky behaviors. By controlling these variables, we should also be able to capture 
differences in binge drinking behavior that vary across participants due to differences in family 
education, income, home life, or general level of income allowance that these teens receive from 
their parents which might have an effect on teenagers’ binge drinking behavior during the time 
period under investigation.  
The final detail of our estimation of equation (1) concerns the distributional shape of binge 
drinking. Given that binge drinking counts are discrete in nature and suffer from over-dispersion, 
estimating equation (1) with an unconditional fixed effects negative binomial regression method 
would be standard (Hausman et al. 1984, Allison and Waterman 2002).15 However, as 
demonstrated in Table 1, there is a large probability mass at zero binge drinking events. Theory 
suggests that the excess zeros are potentially generated by a separate process from the count values 
and that the excess zeros should be modeled independently using a zero-inflated negative binomial 
(ZINB) specification, which we investigate as well. Vuong (1989) tests of model fit fail to 
demonstrate a superior fit of the zero-inflated model compared to the simpler negative binomial 
specification.16 Nevertheless, given the high mass of observations with zero accidents, we will 
demonstrate that results are robust to using the ZINB approach.  
All inference of estimates in equation (1) is based on standard errors that have been 
corrected to allow for non-independence of observations from the same state through clustering 
                                                          
15 Allison and Waterman (2002) demonstrate that a conditional likelihood method for negative binomial regression 
does not qualify as a true fixed effects method because it does not control for unchanging covariates, hence an 
unconditional estimation of a fixed effects negative binomial model is needed. 
16 In all cases the p-value is large and negative. These findings suggest that the zero-inflated model is 
indistinguishable from the non-zero-inflated-analog; indicating that excess zeros are not likely generated by a 
separate process from the count values. 
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(Arellano 1987, Bertrand et al. 2004). Statistical analyses were conducted using STATA version 
13 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
Table 4 presents estimation results for the fixed-effects negative binominal model with 
number of binge drinking events in the last 30 days as the dependent variable. Results are reported 
as incidence rate ratios (IRR) and the corresponding p-values are in brackets.  IRRs are the 
exponentiated coefficients and indicate the difference in binge drinking predicted by the model 
when a variable of interest is increased by one unit above its mean value while all other variables 
are kept constant at their means (see Table 1 for the summary statistics). An IRR value greater 
than one reflects a positive relationship between binge drinking and the particular independent 
variable, while a value less than one suggests a negative association. Statistical significance 
is based on a test of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between binge drinking and 
the control variable (i.e., IRR is equal to one). Column (1) in Table 4 provides the result using only 
state and time fixed effects (no other controls). The estimate of  is positive1.10) and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.033). Estimates indicate that a $1 increase in the real minimum 
wage results in a 10% increase in binge drinking behavior.  
In the second through fourth columns of table 4 we sequentially add controls for 
demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, education, etc.), reported risky behaviors and beer 
tax rates. It may be the case that some of the right hand side variables in the regression (e.g. 
education, smoking, etc.) may also be impacted by changes to minimum wages: hence the 
coefficient on the minimum wage variable might not be picking up the full impact of changes to 
the minimum wage and demonstrating the results in this fashion is useful. Results are very 
 39 
 
consistent across specifications and progressively improved significance (p-value==0.000). Given 
the inclusion of new information, it is often useful to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates on 
the other covariates included. In looking at these controls specifically, we observe that the 
estimated effects are as one would anticipate: older teens, males, and teens who engage in other 
risky behaviors engage in binge drinking most frequently.  
 The identification strategy explained to this point predicts that after inclusion of state and 
time fixed effects, demographic characteristics, and different risky behaviors, we will be able to 
estimate the impact of changes in the minimum wage on binge drinking habits accurately. One 
concern, however, is that changes in minimum wage laws might be correlated with some 
unobserved trends in binge drinking behaviors. While we don’t suspect that this is an issue, in 
column (5) we move to our preferred specification and include state-specific time trends (TtLs) 
into the model. This specification should account for potential differences in uncaptured trends in 
binge drinking across locations. As is evident, the primary measure of interest is very similar 
(coefficient = 1.09, p-value=0.018), and provides the same inference that increases in the real 
minimum wage are associated with increased binge drinking activity in teens.17,18  
Next, we extend our initial analysis to an investigation of differences between genders. The 
literature has demonstrated that the prevalence of binge drinking among men is twice that observed 
in women (e.g., Naimi T.S. et al. 2003; Nolen Hoeksema S. 2004). Hence, we would expect the 
impact of minimum wages on binge drinking to be larger among males if the results are sensible. 
To explore this difference explicitly, in the columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we re-estimate the 
results provided in column (5) of Table 4 but for males and females separately. While the estimates 
                                                          
17 Results are robust to using a zero-inflated negative binominal approach, with participant age and smoking habits 
used as the inflators. See Appendix B. 
18 Results are robust to excluding 1991 from the sample.  
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are positive in both cases, it is evident that the relationship estimates presented in Table 5 are 
driven by the males in the sample (p-value==0.002). Estimates suggest that a $1 increase in 
minimum wage results in a 12% increase in binge drinking for males, with much smaller and 
insignificant results for females. These outcomes improve confidence that the estimated 
relationship is a causal one. 
Lastly, as a small extension, we attempt to provide greater insights if it is employed teens 
that are impacting outcomes. Specifically, if we assume that the primary channel through which 
minimum wages impact binge drinking is by increasing incomes among working teens, then one 
would expect the measured effect to be zero if we were able to restrict our sample to those teens 
who are not employed. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the work status of the teens 
to effectively capitalize on in the YBRS sample. Nevertheless, as a second best alternative, a 
specification which included an interaction between the minimum wage and the proportion of 
teenagers working at or around the minimum wage in the relevant state and time period may also 
provide some insights in this area. With this in mind we collected CPS Outgoing Rotation Group 
data for the years that match our YBRS sample, and constructed the percentage of working teens 
in each state-year that are working at or around the prevailing minimum wage in their state of 
residence (no more than $1 above and $2 above, separately). Next, we re-specify our initial model 
by including this proportion and an interaction between the proportions with the minimum wage 
variable of interest. Results are mixed and generally do not provide tremendous inference (see 
Appendix C). Specifically, when interacting with the share earning less than $1 above the 
minimum wage, the IRR estimates are approximately 1.00 in the full specification, suggesting no 
difference as the share impacted varies. On the other hand, when the share is defined as teens 
earning less than $2 above the minimum wage, the IRR estimates on the interaction range from 
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1.14 to 1.30, which suggests that as the portion of the working teen population that earns at or 
around minimum wage rises, the impact of a minimum wage increase on binge drinking is 
estimated to be meaningfully stronger. Nevertheless, none of these estimates are statistically 
significant, so it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from these estimates. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Given the large negative consequences associated with excessive alcohol consumption, 
understanding the effects of government policies aimed at lowering alcohol consumption and 
alcohol-related accidents has been an important topic of research for some time. However, until 
recently, studying the impact of policies that don’t directly target alcohol-related outcomes has not 
been investigated strongly. In this case, we investigate the impact that polices aimed at increasing 
population income, through minimum wage increases, which may have on binge drinking behavior 
among teens. Results provide evidence that an increase in minimum wages is positively associated 
with binge drinking activity among teenagers, specifically males. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of time and state fixed effects, controls for age, education, race, ethnicity, the presence 
of other risky behaviors such as daily smoking habit and general alcohol consumption behavior, 
and states beer taxes. 
The findings presented here are consistent with the results presented in Adams et al. (2012), 
which identified that increases in real minimum wages lead to increases in alcohol-related 
accidents among teenagers. Different from the previous research on the issue, this paper attempts 
to explicitly investigate the impact of this policy change on the underlying behavior of interest, 
alcohol-consumption. Hence, provides a more meaningfully understand how increases in 
minimum wages potentially lead to increased alcohol-related fatalities among teens and impact the 
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general relationship that exists between teenagers and minimum wages. We are also able to isolate 
that this effect is, at a minimum, stronger among males, which is consistent with the general 
observation that males are much more likely to binge drink than females. 
That said, results should be informed by potential limitations of the YRBS data. First, there 
is no information on employment (or related factors) in the YRBS, so an examination of the effect 
of minimum wage increases on binge drinking separately for those teens employed and not 
employed (or by earnings) is not feasible. Second, because the YRBS is a survey full-time students, 
selection bias may impact results if minimum wages impact teen drop-out rates. Lastly, there may 
be measurement error, as teens are asked to self-report illegal behaviors, which may meaningfully 
impact outcomes.    
Nevertheless, given the high costs associated with excessive alcohol consumption and the 
particularly high propensity for risk taking activities associated with teenagers, governmental 
bodies should be caution and cognizant of the negative consequences that such polices may have 
on teen behaviors. That said, our results should not be interpreted as a denunciation of minimum 
wage policies, but rather as a quantitative analysis of how teenagers respond to exogenous changes 
in disposable income. As such, public policy leaders might consider implementing corresponding 
measures alongside an increase in minimum wages that would help to mitigate potentially harmful 
behavioral responses observed in teenagers, such as increased taxation on beer. At the least, local 
officials should recognize the potential need for careful implementation of increased minimum 
wages. The Federal government already has a limited provision for a “youth minimum wage”, but 
this policy only applies for the first 90 days of employment. Many states have similar policies as 
well. Given the results presented here and in related studies, perhaps it would be useful to consider 
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more meaningful youth minimum wage restrictions or related constraints to help offset potentially 
negative health behaviors. 
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TABLE 1.- STATE LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percent 
Binge Drinking (# of days having more than 5 drinks in last 30 days)   97,412  1.66 3.87 0 20  
Real Minimum Wage in 2011 dollars   97,412  6.80 0.76 5.77 8.82  
Number of the days the respondent drunk alcohol in her/his life   97,412  24.05 33.61 0 100  
Real Excise Tax in 2011 dollars   97,412  0.29 0.19 0.06 1.20  
Dummy Variables       
Age Groups       
14 years old   97,412      9.17 
15 years old   97,412      22.28 
16 years old   97,412      25.90 
17 years old   97,412      26.16 
18 years old   97,412      16.48 
if gender is male   97,412      48.56 
education year==9   97,412      24.14 
education year==10    97,412      24.71 
education year==11    97,412      25.48 
education year==12    97,412      25.67 
if ethnicity is Hispanic   97,412      26.65 
if race is white   97,412      48.39 
if race is black   97,412      21.15 
if race is other   97,412      30.46 
if smoking daily   97,412      14.07 
if smoked ever   97,412          58.40 
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TABLE 2.-STATE LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MALES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percent 
Binge Drinking (# of days having more than 5 drinks in last 30 days) 47,306 2.02 4.35 0 20  
Real Minimum Wage in 2011 dollars 47,306 6.80 0.76 5.77 8.82  
Number of the days the respondent drunk alcohol in her/his life 47,306 27.59 36.19 0 100  
Real Excise Tax in 2011 dollars 47,306 0.28 0.19 0.06 1.20  
Dummy Variables       
Age Groups       
14 years old 47,306     8.24 
15 years old 47,306     21.50 
16 years old 47,306     25.68 
17 years old 47,306     26.48 
18 years old 47,306     18.10 
education year==9 47,306     23.95 
education year==10  47,306     24.57 
education year==11  47,306     25.46 
education year==12  47,306     26.02 
if ethnicity is Hispanic 47,306     26.46 
if race is white 47,306     49.40 
if race is black 47,306     20.13 
if race is other 47,306     30.47 
if smoking daily 47,306     15.13 
if smoked ever 47,306         60.29 
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TABLE 3.-STATE LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FEMALES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percent 
Binge Drinking (# of days having more than 5 drinks in last 30 days)    50,106  1.32 3.32 0 20  
Real Minimum Wage in 2011 dollars    50,106  6.80 0.76 5.77 8.82  
Number of the days the respondent drunk alcohol in her/his life    50,106  20.71 30.60 0 100  
Excise Tax    50,106  0.29 0.19 0.1 1.20  
Dummy Variables       
Age Groups       
14 years old    50,106      10.05 
15 years old    50,106      23.02 
16 years old    50,106      26.1 
17 years old    50,106      25.86 
18 years old    50,106      14.96 
education year==9    50,106      24.32 
education year==10    50,106      24.84 
education year==11    50,106      25.5 
education year==12    50,106      25.34 
if ethnicity is Hispanic    50,106      26.83 
if race is white    50,106      47.43 
if race is black    50,106      22.12 
if race is other    50,106      30.45 
if smoking daily    50,106      13.06 
if smoked ever    50,106          56.63 
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TABLE 4--NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF BINGE DRINKING AMONG TEENAGERS 
AGED 14-18 
  1 2 3 4 5 
VARIABLES 
FE 
ONLY  
FE+DEMOG ADD EDUCATION 
FULL 
SPEC 
FULL + 
TRENDS 
Real minimum wage in 2011 dollars 1.10** 1.08** 1.08** 1.13*** 1.09** 
 [0.033] [0.025] [0.024] [0.000] [0.018] 
Dummy variable for age 14  0.44*** 0.52*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 15  0.52*** 0.61*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 16  0.70*** 0.79*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Dummy variable for age 17  0.84*** 0.89*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
If male  1.59*** 1.60*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ethnicity if Hispanic  1.20* 1.20* 1.17*** 1.17*** 
  [0.037] [0.038] [0.000] [0.000] 
Race if white  1.36*** 1.35*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Race if black  0.60*** 0.61*** 0.88* 0.88* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.017] 
Education year==10 grade   1.06 1.03 1.03 
   [0.096] [0.259] [0.259] 
Education year==11 grade   1.10* 1.03 1.03 
   [0.043] [0.533] [0.515] 
Education year==12 grade   1.22*** 0.98 0.99 
   [0.001] [0.734] [0.778] 
If smoking daily    1.35*** 1.35*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
If smoked ever    2.11*** 2.11*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of days drunk alcohol in his life    1.03*** 1.03*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
Real excise tax in 2011 dollars    0.61 1.51 
    [0.306] [0.274] 
Observations 97,412 97,412 97,412 97,412 97,412 
State and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
State Time Trends NO NO NO NO YES 
All models use a negative binomial approach. Results show the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) and P-values are given in parenthesis. The dependent variable is binge 
drinking which is based on the answer given by YRBS survey respondents to the question “During the past 30 days, on how many days did you have 5 or more 
drinks of alcohol in a row, that is, within a couple of hours?”  The dependent variable is survey takers responses in a given  state-year cell. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. ***, **,* denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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TABLE 5--NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF BINGE DRINKING 
AMONG TEENAGERS AGED 14-18, Males and Females 
  1 2 
VARIABLES Males Females 
Real minimum wage in 2011 dollars 1.12*** 1.05 
 [0.002] [0.213] 
Dummy variable for age 14 0.71*** 0.85 
 [0.000] [0.090] 
Dummy variable for age 15 0.83*** 0.9 
 [0.000] [0.164] 
Dummy variable for age 16 0.91** 0.95 
 [0.003] [0.340] 
Dummy variable for age 17 0.94** 0.93* 
 [0.003] [0.040] 
If male   
   
Education year==10 grade 1.02 1.02 
 [0.576] [0.559] 
Education year==11 grade 1.06 0.98 
 [0.206] [0.841] 
Education year==12 grade 1.03 0.95 
 [0.553] [0.578] 
Ethnicity if Hispanic 1.16** 1.19*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] 
Race if white 1.09** 1.18*** 
 [0.007] [0.000] 
Race if black 0.93 0.83* 
 [0.111] [0.013] 
If smoking daily 1.35*** 1.35*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
If smoked ever 2.03*** 2.23*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of days drunk alcohol in his life 1.03*** 1.03*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Real excise tax in 2011 dollars 1.65 1.34 
 [0.363] [0.620] 
Observations 47,306 50,106 
State and Year FE YES YES 
State Time Trends YES YES 
All models use a negative binomial approach. Results show the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) and P-values are given in parenthesis. The 
dependent variable is binge drinking which is based on the answer given by YRBS survey respondents to the question “ During the 
past 30 days, on how many days did you have 5 or more drinks of alcohol in a row, that is, within a couple of hours?” The dependent 
variable is survey takers responses in a given state-year cell. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary 
patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. 
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APPENDIX A 
Nominal Minimum Wages by State and Year (in dollars), 1991-2011 
State  1991 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
ALABAMA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
ALASKA 4.75 5.65 5.65 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.18 7.75 
ARIZONA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.75 7.25 7.35 
ARKANSAS 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.25 6.84 7.25 
CALIFORNIA 4.25 5.75 6.25 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 
COLORADO 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.85 7.28 7.36 
CONNECTICUT 4.27 5.65 6.40 6.90 7.10 7.65 8.00 8.25 
DELAWARE 4.14 5.44 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.65 7.18 7.25 
FLORIDA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.82 6.67 7.22 7.29 
GEORGIA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
HAWAII 4.15 5.25 5.25 6.25 6.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 
IDAHO 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
ILLINOIS 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.50 7.00 7.88 8.25 
INDIANA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
IOWA 4.25 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.94 7.25 7.25 
KANSAS 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
KENTUCKY 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.90 7.25 
LOUISIANA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
MAINE 4.15 5.15 5.15 6.25 6.39 6.81 7.31 7.50 
MARYLAND 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.15 6.84 7.25 
MASSACHUSETTS 4.14 5.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00 
MICHIGAN 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 7.05 7.40 7.40 
MINNESOTA 4.18 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.40 6.15 6.84 7.25 
MISSISSIPPI 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
MISSOURI 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.50 7.10 7.25 
MONTANA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 7.02 7.35 
NEBRASKA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
NEVADA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.15 6.84 8.25 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 4.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.61 7.25 7.25 
NEW JERSEY 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.40 7.15 7.18 7.25 
NEW MEXICO 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 7.50 7.50 
NEW YORK 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.00 7.15 7.18 7.25 
NORTH CAROLINA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.15 6.84 7.25 
NORTH DAKOTA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
OHIO 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.85 7.30 7.40 
OKLAHOMA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
OREGON 4.75 6.50 6.50 6.90 7.25 7.80 8.40 8.50 
PENNSYLVANIA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.70 7.18 7.25 
RHODE ISLAND 4.45 5.40 6.15 6.15 6.75 7.40 7.40 7.40 
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SOUTH CAROLINA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
SOUTH DAKOTA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
TENNESSEE 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
TEXAS 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
UTAH 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
VERMONT 4.18 5.38 6.25 6.25 7.00 7.53 8.06 8.15 
VIRGINIA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
WASHINGTON 4.25 5.70 6.72 7.01 7.35 7.93 8.55 8.67 
WEST VIRGINIA 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 6.55 7.25 7.25 
WISCONSIN 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.47 5.74 6.84 7.25 
WYOMING 4.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.44 6.84 7.25 
Source: January Edition of the Monthly Labor Review. Minimum wage values reflect the monthly average nominal minimum wage for every state 
and every year. Minimum wage values used for estimation in the paper are adjusted to 2011 GDP deflator to correct for inflation.  
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APPENDIX B 
ZERO INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF BINGE DRINKING 
AMONG TEENAGERS AGED 14-18 
VARIABLES  ZINB 
Real minimum wage in 2011 dollars  1.09*** 
  [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 14  0.81*** 
  [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 15  0.87*** 
  [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 16  0.92*** 
  [0.001] 
Dummy variable for age 17  0.93*** 
  [0.000] 
If male  1.10*** 
  [0.000] 
Education year==10 grade  1.03 
  [0.202] 
Education year==11 grade  1.03 
  [0.320] 
Education year==12 grade  0.98 
  [0.587] 
Ethnicity if Hispanic  1.17*** 
  [0.000] 
Race if white  1.13*** 
  [0.000] 
Race if black  0.88*** 
  [0.000] 
If smoking daily  1.32*** 
  [0.000] 
If smoked ever  2.10*** 
  [0.000] 
Number of days respondent drunk alcohol in his life  1.03*** 
  [0.000] 
Real Excise Tax in 2011 dollars  1.51 
  [0.217] 
State and Year FE  Yes 
State Time Trend  Yes 
Observations  97,412 
Z score  -4.49 
P Value  1.00 
Results show the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) and P-values are given in parenthesis. Our dependent variable is binge drinking: The answer of YRBS 
survey respondents for the question of “how many days have they had more than 5 drinks in last 30 days?”. The dependent variable is survey takers 
responses in a given state-year cell. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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APPENDIX C  
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF BINGE DRINKING AMONG TEENAGERS AGED 14-18; 
ESTIMATES INCLUDING INTERACTIONS WITH THE PROPORTION OF TEEN WORKERS NEAR MINIMUM WAGE  
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES FULL SPEC FULL + TRENDS FULL SPEC FULL + TRENDS 
Real minimum wage in 2011 dollars 1.08** 1.08** 1.13*** 1.09** 
 [0.025] [0.024] [0.000] [0.018] 
Proportion of working teens wage near MW# 0.83 1.06 0.17 0.34 
 [0.836] [0.958] [0.252] [0.532] 
Interaction: Real MW * Proportion near MW# 1.02 0.98 1.30 1.14 
 [0.919] [0.885] [0.300] [0.640] 
Dummy variable for age 14 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 15 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Dummy variable for age 16 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Dummy variable for age 17 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
If male 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ethnicity if Hispanic 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Race if white 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Race if black 0.88* 0.88* 0.88* 0.88* 
 [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.017] 
Education year==10 grade 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 [0.258] [0.259] [0.257] [0.258] 
Education year==11 grade 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 [0.533] [0.517] [0.531] [0.514] 
Education year==12 grade 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 
 [0.731] [0.773] [0.727] [0.774] 
If smoking daily 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
If smoked ever 2.11*** 2.11*** 2.11*** 2.11*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of days drunk alcohol in his life 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Real excise tax in 2011 dollars 0.61 1.46 0.55 1.49 
 [0.302] [0.293] [0.224] [0.304] 
Observations 97,412 97,412 97,412 97,412 
State and Year FE YES YES YES YES 
State Time Trends NO NO NO YES 
All models use a negative binomial approach. Results show the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) and P-values are given in parenthesis. The dependent 
variable is binge drinking which is based on the answer given by YRBS survey respondents to the question “During the past 30 days, on how many 
days did you have 5 or more drinks of alcohol in a row, that is, within a couple of hours?”  The dependent variable is survey takers responses in a given 
state-year cell. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in 
a given state. # In columns 1 and 2, proportion corresponds to no more than $1 above the prevailing minimum wage in any state-year. In columns 3 
and 4, proportion corresponds to no more than $2 above the prevailing minimum wage in any state-year ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively.
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Chapter 3: Product Line Depth and Shelf Space Competition in the U.S. Beer Industry 
 
 
Abstract 
Product variety has been an important topic not only for the firms but also for the researchers for 
last decades. While firms have been increasing product variety to maximize their profit, 
researchers have been trying to explore its effect on economic outcomes. Previous empirical 
research has focused mainly on the effects of managing product line length, which measures the 
number of total products or items in a firms product mix. In this paper, we explicitly examine 
product line depth, which measures the number of variations of a specific product: creating 
different sizes or packages of the same product.  To examine effect of product line depth on 
consumer demand and firm performance, we formulate an econometric model that considers both 
consumer choices and firm strategies of product line depth decisions, using product-level scanner 
data in the U.S. beer industry. On the demand side, we formulate and estimate a product-level 
discrete choice model and include a measure of product line depth in the utility function to 
investigate consumer preference for variety. On the supply side, oligopolistic firms compete in 
both prices and product line depth, and maximize their profits.  Our results suggest that while an 
increase in package size variety for bottles orcans brings an increase in market share, after a 
threshold there are diminishing returns. Further, the simulation results suggest that for firms in the 
beer industry, an optimal product line depth strategy is to extend the product line depth by 
providing more package size options than container size options. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Increased product variety can benefit consumers as it more closely matches the needs of 
particular market segments. By extending their product line, a firm may therefore increase their 
overall market demand (Bayus and Putsis 1999) and potentially their profits as well (Tremblay 
and Tremblay 2005). By actively managing product lines, managers may also be able to better 
address competitive pressures (Draganska and Jain 2005) and potentially deter entry by 
competitors (Bayus and Putsis 1999). Further, a greater variety of products may retain customer 
loyalty and allows firms to charge higher prices. Alternatively, extending a firm’s product lines 
may have drawbacks, which could negatively impact overall profits. Extending product lines raises 
firm costs, which could negate any additional revenues (Bayus and Putsis 1999). While extending 
the line could increase demand, it could also lead to cannibalization of demand which could 
ultimately weaken the firm’s brand (Quelch and Kenny 1994).  
There is mixed empirical evidence regarding the impact of product line extension on firm 
performance. Kadiyali et al (1999) find that yogurt firms that extend their product line gain price-
setting power (i.e. prices over marginal costs) and obtain increased sales. Kekre and Srinivasan 
(1990) find that US manufacturing firms gain market share benefits and increased profitability 
with broader product lines. More importantly, they find no empirical support for increased 
production costs. While Draganska and Jain (2005) also find that product line length can lead to 
greater market share for yogurt firms, they identify decreasing returns to product-line length. 
Bayus and Putsis (1999) find a negative relationship between market share and product 
proliferation in the computer industry. They suggest that the cost increases associated with a 
broader product line dominate any potential demand increases. Anecdotal evidence further 
suggests that numerous retailers use product line reduction as a way to cut costs (Brant et al. 2009). 
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The previous empirical research has focused mainly on the effects of managing product line length, 
which measures the number of total products or items in a firms product mix. In this paper, we 
explicitly examine product line depth, which measures the number of variations of a specific 
product (Kotler and Keller 2009). For instance, creating different sizes or packages of the same 
product is an example of increasing product depth. This distinction is relevant for several reasons.  
First, lengthening a product line requires greater investment in creating new products, 
which requires more time and investment. Further, these new products may ultimately compete 
directly in the marketplace for consumer demand, which could lead to cannibalization of a firm’s 
own market share. Alternatively, increasing product depth does not require a new product, only a 
variation in how the product is delivered to the consumers. As such, there is less investment 
required. In addition, product competition is lessened since the product is virtually identical, save 
minor modifications to the existing product. Consequently, we might expect some of the 
previously expressed concerns regarding product line extension to be less relevant when analyzing 
product line depth.  
To examine the impact of product line depth, we focus our research on the U.S. retail beer 
industry. This is a dynamic industry that has changed tremendously over the past four decades. 
Importantly, brewers often extend their product line length by introducing new product varieties 
into the market place under their parent company label. At the same time, most major macro 
breweries earn their greatest market share through their flagship beers.19 For instance, while 
Annheuser-Busch has an extensive product line, the majority of their sales still come from 
Budweiser in the United States. Such emphasis on major flagship brands has allowed for 
                                                          
19 A macro brewery is generally defined as any brewery making over 6 million barrels of beer per year. 
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opportunities to gain market share by extending product line depth. In particular, we find that 
brewers often invest in new packaging variations to appeal to consumers while maintaining the 
same product. For example, brewers can offer a single product using a variety of package sizes 
(e.g. 6 pack, 12 pack, 30 pack etc.), container types (cans, bottles or kegs), container sizes (e.g. 12, 
15, 18, 24 ounces etc.) or any combinations of these. Extending the product line depth can be more 
cost effective and straightforward since no new product development is required. Further, by 
creating convenience for consumers seeking a particular package type, brewers may capture 
greater market share or potentially increase profits via price discrimination.  
Within the retail beer market, there are two other important marketing benefits that may 
come from extending product depth. First, by offering a larger variety of packages, brewers can 
obtain more valuable shelf-space in grocery stores. Given limited shelf space, packages that can 
fit specific dimensions are more easily stocked. Further, by having a variety of package sizes in 
stores, brewers can create a type of billboard effect where their brand name is widely advertised 
across more space. Consider the image of a fully stocked beer section with a wall of Budweiser 
products extending across the majority of shelf space. Finally, if firms can successfully gain more 
shelf space by extending product depth, they may ultimately create barriers for new entrants into 
the market.  
Clearly, the costs associated with extending product line depth are relevant, making the 
benefits of such managerial actions an empirical question. To date, we are unaware of other studies 
that explicitly examine the impact of product line depth on firms. In this paper, to examine effect 
of product line depth on consumer demand and firm performance, we formulate an econometric 
model that considers both consumer choices and firm strategies of product line depth decisions. 
On the demand side, we formulate and estimate a product-level discrete choice model and include 
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a measure of product line depth in the utility function to investigate consumer preference for 
variety. On the supply side, oligopolistic firms compete in both prices and product line depth, and 
maximize their profits.  A cost term of product length are introduced into firms’ profit 
maximization problem following Draganska and Jain (2005).  
Our results suggest that, while an increase in package size variety for bottles or cans brings 
an increase in market shares, after a threshold there are diminishing returns to increasing package 
variety. Further, the simulation results suggest that, for firms in beer industry, an optimal product 
line depth strategy is to extend the product line depth by providing more package size and container 
size options,  but relatively more of the package size options.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describe the data and summary 
statistics. Section 3 introduces the empirical model. Section 4 presents the estimation results and 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our analysis. 
3.2 Data  
The main dataset used in this analysis is the Nielsen Scanner Database (NSD), which gives 
a representative sample of purchase habits for different locations across the U.S. The NSD data is 
aggregated by Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMAs), which are geographic areas defined by 
Nielsen Media Research Company. This analysis covers ten DMAs including Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco and Seattle. The 
frequency of observations is a rolling four-week block, which is defined as "monthly" for 
simplicity, from 2008 to 2012. NSD includes DMA level sales data for supermarkets, grocery 
stores, and drug stores with more than $2 million annual sales in the U.S., which consists of dollar 
sales, volume sales, and prices for beer products. In addition, it also provides detailed information 
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on product characteristics (e.g. brand names, container sizes, package sizes, etc.), marketing (e.g. 
price and in-store displays), location and time of sales. The final data includes 47 brands from 15 
companies. 
We provide summary statistics for the full sample in Table 1. The average market share of 
a beer product in one DMA in a month is 0.43%. We calculate the market share of each beer 
product in our sample as a share of the total potential market size in the alcohol beverage market. 
Specifically, the potential market size is the combined per capita consumption (in volume) of all 
types of alcohol beverages including beer, wine and spirit times population in each market. Data 
on per capita alcohol consumption is collected from National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism.20 
On average, the price per ounce of a beer product is $0.09. The price is calculated as sales-
weighted prices over time, market, container size and package size. An average beer product has 
calories of 12.51 per ounce with the alcohol content of 0.42 per ounce. Of all beer products 
available on the market, around 64% of them are domestic beer and the rest of imported products. 
In this analysis, product line depth offered by one brand is defined on two dimensions: 
container size variety and package size variety. For example, if a beer brand offers products in 6-
pack, 12- pack and 18-pack in a market, then the package size variety for this brand is three. 
Similarly, if a beer brand offers 8 oz, 12 oz, 16 oz, 24 oz, and 36 oz beer products in a market, then 
product variety by size for this brand is five. Further, since most beer products offer in either can 
or bottle, we distinguish the size and package varieties by different materials: “package size variety 
                                                          
20 http:/www.niaaa.nih.gov/ 
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by can”, “package variety size by bottle”, “container size variety by can”, “container size variety 
by bottle”. On average, a beer brand owns a total of 7 different package offerings, 3.23 for canned 
beer and 3.88 for bottled beer. In terms of container size variety, an average beer brand offers 4 
different sizes, 1.77 in cans and 2.39 in bottles. Overall, beer brands provide more variety options 
for bottled beer. We further provide summary statistics for canned and bottled beer separately. The 
average market share of a canned beer in a DMA is 0.53%, which is slightly higher than that of 
bottled beer. The unit price is higher for bottled beer while there is no significant difference of 
alcohol content and calories between the two types of beer products. The percentage of domestic 
product is significantly higher in canned beer. 
We also provide summary statistics by different firm types in Table 2. In the beer market, 
there are three types of firms: mass producers, international brewers, and craft brewers21. Beer 
products offered by craft brewers are the most expensive ones, $0.12 per ounce on average, 
followed by international brewers and mass producers. Imported beers by international brewers 
enjoy the highest market share per DMA, which is around 0.74%. It is worth to notice that imported 
beers and craft beers are not available in every DMA so the numbers of observations are 
significantly lower than that of mass producers. The alcohol content and calories are similar across 
products from different types of firms. Mass producers offer a higher number of product variety 
both in packaging and size. Craft brewers, on the other hand, focus on bottled beers and a smaller 
set of product variety. 
 
                                                          
21 Craft brewers are defined as producing fewer than 6 million barrels per year and having less than 25 percent 
ownership by a non-craft brewer. 
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3.3 Model and Estimation 
Demand Side 
We set up the demand side of our model as follows. Assume there are a total of J beer 
products on the market. In this analysis, a product is defined as a combination of a different brand, 
size, package and container type (bottle or can). For example, a 6-pack, 12-oz of Budweiser and a 
12-pack, 12-oz of Budweiser are considered as different products.  
A consumer i in market d chooses a product j from our choice set j=1,...,J  at time t to 
maximize his utility. They are also given the choice of not buying beer but choosing an outside 
product in the beverage market (j=0). So the utility that a consumer i from purchasing beer j in 
market d at time t is given by 
  𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2 +  𝜉𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡                   (1) 
                                                      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑁;   𝑗 = 0,1, … . , 𝐽; 
where 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of observed product characteristics of beer product j., such as calories, alcohol 
content, style, type of the products, etc. 𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡is the unit price per ounce of product j in market d at 
time t. The unit price and product characteristics is unique to each product.  
 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡  is the total number of product varieties, or product line length, of a brand to 
which product j belongs at time t, which is common across a given brand. The estimated coefficient 
will answer the question of interest: whether a brand benefit from offering a larger variety of 
products. We further break down the definition of product line depth by container size, package 
size and container type (can or bottle). Specifically, we have four types of product variety of a 
brand: “container size variety by can”, “container size variety by bottle”, “package size variety by 
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can”, and “package size variety by bottle”. We also include 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2  into the utility function. By 
including the square term of the product variety variable, we expect to determine whether market 
demand is concave or convex in product variety (Draganska and Jain, 2005). Or in other words, 
whether there is an increasing or decreasing rate of return for larger product variety.  
𝜉𝑗 captures the unobserved product characteristics of beer product j. 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 is a mean zero 
stochastic error term that follows an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution, with a density  𝑓(𝜀). 
In addition, there might be unobservable factors changing over the time and location which might 
affect consumer's decision. Thus, we also include time and DMA fixed effects. Lastly, we include 
brand and type fixed effect to control for firm specific consumers’ preferences. We have 19 
different types of beer products and 50 different brands in our sample.  
The consumer will choose the beer product which gives him the highest utility. Assuming 
i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution for the error terms, the market share of product j in market 
d at time t is given by   
               𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0+𝛼1𝑋𝑗+𝛼2𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡+ 𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2 + 𝜉𝑗)
1+∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛼0+𝛼1𝑋𝑘+𝛼2𝑝𝑘𝑑𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡+ 𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡
2 + 𝜉𝑗)
𝐽
𝑘=1 
              (2) 
To complete the model, the option of a product selection outside the choice set is also given 
to the consumers. The utility of the outside option is normalized to be constant over time and equal 
to zero. Therefore, the market share of the outside option is given by 
       𝑠0 =
1
1+∑ exp (𝛼0+𝛼1𝑋𝑘+𝛼2𝑝𝑘𝑑𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡+ 𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑘𝑡
2 + 𝜉𝑗)
𝐽
𝑘=1 
                    (3) 
Taking the ratio of the market share of the product j with respect to 𝑠0;  
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𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑠0
= exp(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2 +  𝜉𝑗)                      (4) 
Taking log of both sides, our model yields the econometric specification of the demand 
side as follows: 
    ln(𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡) − ln (𝑠0) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2 +  𝜉𝑗          (5) 
Supply Side 
Firms compete in prices and product variety assuming a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. They 
maximize their profits by choosing the optimal number of product varieties to offer and then setting 
one price for each product they carry. 
Let 𝐽𝑚 be the set of beer products produced by firm m, which is a subset of all products 
available, J. Then firm m’s problem is to maximize its profits at time t by determine how many 
products to offer and the optimal prices for all products: 
                 𝜋𝑚𝑑𝑡 = ∑ (𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 )𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 𝑀 − 𝑔(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡)𝑗∈𝐽𝑚                            (6) 
where 𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚  is the price of the beer product j in market d and 𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚  is the market share of beer product 
j at time t. M denotes the potential market size in each DMA (market d). This market size is defined 
by multiplying the per capita alcohol (beer, sprit and wine) consumption by total population in the 
considered market.  𝑐𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚  is the corresponding marginal cost for production. In particular, the 
marginal costs can be expressed as: 
                           𝑐𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 = 𝜔𝑗𝑑𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜂𝑗𝑑𝑡                                                                         (7) 
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where  𝜔𝑗𝑑𝑡
′  is a vector of cost shifters, which consists of wages, factor prices, etc. and  𝜂𝑗𝑑𝑡 is a 
random supply shock, which is assumed to be independent of 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡. 𝑔(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡) is the fixed costs 
of product variety for the firm. Specifically, we specify 𝑔(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡) as a quadratic function of 
product variety, which allows the relationship to be either linear, concave or convex depending on 
the signs of the estimated coefficients. Since only derivatives will be used in the estimation, we 
specify the marginal cost of product variety as: 
                              𝑔′(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡                                     (8) 
where 𝑤𝑗𝑡 is error term, which captures the random fluctuations in the marginal costs of product 
variety. 𝑤𝑗𝑡 is assumed to be independent of 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡, but is allowed to be correlated with the 
unobserved product characteristics 𝜉𝑗 and the supply shock 𝜂𝑗𝑑𝑡.  
Assuming a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in prices, the first order conditions for the profit function 
with respect to the prices given by 
                               
𝜕𝜋𝑚𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑀𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 +  𝑀 ∑ (𝑝𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚 )
𝐽
𝑘=1
∗ Ω𝑗𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 = 0                            (9)                  
                
𝜕𝜋𝑚𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
= 𝑀 ∑ (𝑝𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚 )
𝐽
𝑘=1
∗ Ω𝑗𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
− 𝑔′(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡) = 0            (10)             
where Ω𝑗𝑘 is an ownership matrix to account for ownership patterns, which is equal to 1, if both 
products j and 𝑘 are owned by the same firm and is equal to 0 otherwise. Further, 
                                     
𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚 = {
 −𝛼2𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡(1 − 𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡)                𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘
    𝛼2𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡skdt                          𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
                                       (11) 
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𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
= {  
(𝛼3 + 2𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡)𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡(1 − 𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡)         𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘
  −(𝛼3 + 2𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡)𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡skdt                      𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
                     (12)           
The first order conditions can then be expressed in the following matrix format as; 
                      𝑃𝐶𝑀 = (𝑝 − 𝑐) = (−Ω ∗ ∆𝑠)−1𝑠                                                                         (13) 
              −𝑀(Ω ∗ ∆𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡)(Ω ∗ ∆𝑠)
−1𝑠 = 𝑔′                                                                       (14) 
where Δ𝑠 and Δ𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 are the matrices of derivatives whose (j, k) element is given by 
𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑚  and 
𝜕𝑠𝑘𝑑𝑡
𝑚
𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
respectively. 
 
Estimation 
By combing the demand side equation (5) and the marginal cost function (7) with the 
F.O.Cs of the firm with respect to price and product variety in equation (13) and (14), we have a 
system of 3J equations to be estimated simultaneously:  
ln(𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡) − ln (𝑠0) −  𝛼1𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡 −  𝛼3𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 − 𝛼4𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡
2 = 𝜉𝑗𝑡                                (15) 
(
1
𝛼2
) (𝛼3 + 2 𝛼4𝑝𝑣𝑏𝑡)𝑀𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽2𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 =  𝑤𝑗𝑡                                                                 (16) 
𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑡 − 𝜔𝑗𝑑𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑗 − (
1
𝛼2
) (
1
1−∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑡𝑘≠𝑗
) = 𝜂𝑗𝑑𝑡                                                                                     (17) 
We use 2SLS to estimate the parameters of the model and estimate these three equations 
simultaneously. As seen clearly in equations (15)-(17), prices, market shares and product variety 
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are determined in the equilibrium simultaneously and correlated with the error terms: 𝜉𝑗𝑡, 𝑤𝑗𝑡, 𝜂𝑗𝑑𝑡. 
This brings out the endogeneity problem of these variables.  
The instrumental variables used in the estimation process should be correlated with the 
endogenous variables but uncorrelated with the error term. Therefore, we use prices of the same 
products in different markets (Hausman et al. 1994), electric prices, wheat prices, natural gas 
prices, oil price, grain prices, average industry wages, energy prices, and producer price index in 
beer industry. These instruments, other than prices in other markets, are cost shifters and are not 
correlated with the market specific demand shocks. Prices of the same products in other markets 
are also commonly used in discrete choice model literature. The same product's prices are likely 
to be correlated across different markets. However, they should not be correlated with specific 
demand shocks of other markets.  
3.4 Empirical Results 
Results from Demand and Supply Sides Estimation 
The results from the demand estimation are presented in Table 3. We first estimate the 
model using different definitions of product variety, package and size, separately. Column 1 shows 
the estimated coefficient using only package size variety.  All coefficients have expected signs. 
The coefficient of price is negative and statistically significant. Consumers prefer beer products 
with higher alcohol content but lower calories. This is consistent with a recent increase in 
consumption of light beers, as obesity has been a leading health crisis for Americans for decades. 
Domestic beer, however, has a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that imported 
products are more popular in the beer market. Consumers buy premium priced imported beers, 
even though they are more expensive.  
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The second panel presents the estimated coefficients of product line depth, which are of 
special interests. The estimated coefficients of  Package size variety by can and Package size 
variety by bottle are all positive and significant, implying that consumers prefer brands that offer 
a larger product variety for both canned and bottled beers. Further, the square terms of both 
varieties are negative and significant. This suggests that increasing product depth via package size 
variety brings higher market shares for beer brands but at a diminishing rate. The estimated 
coefficient of Package size variety by bottle is 5.84, which is significantly higher than that of 
Package size variety by can, 1.33. This implies that consumers prefer more packaging options for 
bottled beers.  
In Column 2 of Table 3, we present the estimation results using container size variety to 
define product line depth. Overall, the estimated coefficients for product characteristics and prices 
are significant with expected signs, telling a similar story. In terms of product variety, the main 
and squared termcoefficients of Container Size variety by bottle are positive and significant, 
suggesting that consumers also like brands that offers more container size options for bottled beer, 
but at a diminishing rate. The main coefficient for Container Size variety by can is not significant 
whereas the squared term is. This suggests a less conclusive effect for cans. 
To see a combined effect of package size and container size varieties, we further estimate 
the model with both measures included. Results are shown in Column 3 of Table 3. Increasing 
container size variety with bottles or cans has a positive and significant impact on consumer 
choices, but at a diminishing rate. On the contrary, there is a negative effect of package size variety 
variables while their square terms have a positive effect on market demand. These results provide 
important implications for beer firms. In particualr, an increase in container size variety has 
increasing benefits that diminishes at some level. Alternatively, these results suggest that beer 
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brands must produce a certain amount of package size variety so that they will not lose their market 
share. That is, with only a limited amount of package variety, brands have lower market share. 
After some threshold, however, they increasing package size variety results in higher market 
shares.  
These results identify important implications for how a beer producer might manage their 
product line depth strategy. In this particular case, a beer producer might benefit from a product 
line depth strategy of higher package size variety and lower container size variety to gain their 
highest market share. At the same time, our results do not identify the limit at which increasing 
package size variety no longer pays off. Attempting to estimate models with a cubic term failed to 
converge. As Iyengar and Lepper (2000) explained, the choice sets with more options are more 
likely to be chosen. However, after a point, mental cost of considering more options also increases, 
which lowers the likelihood of choosing the set. Thus, the best strategy for firms to provide the 
optimal number of products. Our results provide important insights for beer firms in terms of 
choosing optimal number and form of product line depth.  
The mean own price elasticity across all DMA's is estimated to be -5.8, indicating an elastic 
demand for the beer industry. Although there are studies finding an inelastic demand for beer 
industry, all of these studies are in the aggregate level. Given that our estimation strategy is the 
product-level, the estimated mean elasticity is in line with other studies in the literature using a 
similar approach. For example, Hausman et. al (1994) calculates segment level elasticities and 
finds elastic demand for beer industry. The elasticities calculated change between -3.76 (for 
Genesee Light) and -6.2 (for Milwaukee’s Best).  
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3.5 Estimated Markups and Simulation 
We calculate the brand markup using equation (13) and the estimated coefficients for each 
brand (Table 4). Importantly, each brand is grouped according to the parent company that markets 
the brand. For the majority of our brands, the same company that brews the beer also markets the 
beer. However, our data also includes several firms which import beer into the US, but do not brew 
the beer or have acquired numerous breweries and manage their brewing production and 
marketing.We identify these firms in Table 4. For each firm, we average the markups by firm, 
brand, time, and DMA.  
Estimated markups tell us the same story about the industry structure as we explain 
previously. Firms increase their product line depth to capture more consumer surplus and gain 
higher profits. The mass producers, Anheuser Bush and Miller, have the highest number of product 
line depth in general and also the highest markups. Following the two industry leaders, the 
international brewers, Crown Imports and Heineken also enjoy higher markups. In particular, 
Corona Extra from Crown Imports is the number one imported beer in the USA and the number 
six beer overall in terms of sales.22 Merchant Du Vin has similar markups to Craft Brewers, which 
are lower than the mass producers. This may be explained by the type of beer that Merchant Du 
Vin imports, which tend to be smaller in production size and offer more specialized styles of beer. 
Similarly, craft brewers have lower levels of production and more unique styles of beer. Further, 
as shown in Table 2, they generally have significantly lower numbers of package size variety and 
container size variety, compare to imported brewers and mass producers. Overall, in the beer 
industry, the higher the product line depth, the higher the estimated markups for the brand.  
                                                          
22 See http://www.crownimportsllc.com/aboutus/aboutus.htm 
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Simulations  
Previous results confirm the positive effect of product line depth on consumer demand, 
market shares, and firms’ markups. In this section, using the estimate coefficients, we conduct a 
series of counterfactual simulations to examine how consumers’ consumption of beer products and 
market shares might be affected by alternative product line depth choices. Table 5 illustrates the 
simulation results. Column 1 and 2 presents the average percentage changes in mean predicted 
market shares in a DMA as we increase container size variety by can and bottle, respectively. 
Column 3 and 4 depict how the predicted market shares would change if we increase package size 
variety by bottle and can, respectively.  
Simulation results provide interesting findings. As we increase container size variety by 
can by one unit, the average predicted market shares increases but start to diminish after the third 
unit of increase. For bottled beers, the mean market share reaches the highest increase when the 
number of container size variety is increased by 3 units.  
According to our estimation results, package size variety must meet some minimal 
threshold before having an effect on market share. As expected, an increase in package size variety 
by can starts to have a positive effect on market share after a 4 unit increase. Similarly, an increase 
in package size variety by bottle starts to increase market share after a 4 unit increase. An 
interesting result to our simulation is that the effect diminishes after the 5th unit.  
All together, these findings suggest that firms can increase market share by identifying the 
optimal number of varieties to provide on retail shelf space. Intuitively, it seems that by extending 
product depth, firms are able to win shelf space without necessarily incurring significant additional 
costs.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
The impact of product line length on the supply and demand in different industries has been 
discussed extensively in the literature. However, to our knowledge, little work has been done 
regarding the impact of product line depth on consumer choices and firm performance. Our results 
provide important insights regarding shelf space competition in the beer industry.  In particular, in 
our data set the optimal product line depth decision for brewers is to extend the product line depth 
by providing more package size and container options with relatively more of the former. By 
offering a larger variety of packages, which are more easily stocked, it is possible for brewers to 
obtain more valuable shelf-space in grocery stores. Further, by having a variety of package sizes 
in stores, brewers can create a type of billboard effect where their brand name is widely advertised 
across more space and thus may ultimately create barriers for new entrants into the market. 
Our analysis highlights the potential benefits of increasing product depth. Using another 
data set or time period, however, we might alternatively find that firms are providing an excessive 
number of package or container options. Consequently, decreasing their product line results in 
greater profits. In such a case, excessive product line extension may ultimately lead to no increase 
in market share, or cannibalization of market share, while still incurring additional costs.  
Another consideration of our analysis is the definition of the markets we are analyzing. Our 
data set primarily includes grocery stores and supermarkets, but excluded liquor and package 
stores. The implications of stocking grocery stores may be different than liquor stores for several 
reasons. First, beer sold in grocery stores competes for shelf space with not only beer products, but 
other food products. To that point, even the clientele at grocery stores have a different agenda 
(buying food and household items) than clientele at a liquor store (buying alcohol). Second, liquor 
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stores often offer a greater variety of beer selection than grocery stores. Anecdotally, liquor stores 
are more often able and willing to carry more unique or specialized beer products. This alludes to 
our final point, which is that our analysis is clearly affected by the types of products we are 
studying. Grocery stores sell large quantities of mass produced beer. Our results may vary if we 
focused on liquor stores that do not necessarily emphasize mass produced beer. To that point, the 
pricing of products is likely to vary as well. 
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Table 1: Monthly DMA-Level Summary Statistics 
Variable Full Sample Subsample 
      Can Bottle 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Market Share (%) 0.43 0.83 0.53 0.85 0.41 0.89 
       
Price ($/ounce) 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.05 
Alcohol Content (per ounce) 0.42 0.07 0.44 0.08 0.41 0.04 
Calories (per ounce) 12.51 1.73 12.27 1.80 12.68 1.67 
Domestic Beer 0.64 0.48 0.89 0.31 0.49 0.50 
            
Brand Product Variety            
Package variety by can 3.23 2.78     
Package variety by bottle 3.88 2.29     
Size variety by can 1.77 1.39     
Size variety by bottle 2.39 1.89     
       
No. of Observations 48,279  19,181  28,409  
Note: DMAs included are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco and Seattle. 
The frequency of observations is progressing four weeks blocks from 2008 to 2012. 
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Table 2: Monthly DMA-Level Summary Statistics by Firm Types 
Note: Mass producers are Anheuser Bush and Miller Coors. International brewers are Crown Imports and Heineken. Craft brewers 
are Alaskan Brewing, Boston Beer Company, C Dean Metropoulos, Craft Brewers Alliance, Deschutes Brewery, Diageo Plc, Full 
Sail Brewing, Merchant Du Vin Corp., New Belgium Brewing, North American Breweries, and Sierra Nevada Breweing. DMAs 
included are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco and Seattle. The frequency 
of observations is progressing four weeks blocks from 2008 to 2012. 
 
 
 
 Mass Producers International Brewers Craft Brewers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Market Share (%) 0.43 0.73 0.74 1.41 0.22 0.33 
       
Price ($/ounce) 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.08 
Alcohol Content (per ounce) 0.43 0.07 0.40 0.03 0.41 0.06 
Calories (per ounce) 12.35 1.83 12.45 0.85 13.16 1.88 
Domestic Beer 0.78 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.35 
            
Product Variety           
Package Size variety by can 4.26 2.68 2.36 1.97 0.60 1.55 
Package Size variety by bottle 4.28 2.66 3.81 1.07 2.56 0.96 
Container size variety by can 2.25 1.24 1.49 1.23 0.38 0.91 
Container size variety by bottle 2.79 2.22 1.92 0.83 1.49 0.61 
       
No. of Observations 30,242  9,296  8,741  
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Price ($/ounce) -16.377*** -21.131*** -66.748*** 
 (2.937) (5.301) (15.69) 
Alcohol Content (per ounce) 16.463*** 16.138*** 12.185* 
 (1.542) (3.049) (6.33) 
Calories (per ounce) -0.051*** -0.057* -0.073 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.07) 
Domestic Beer -13.048*** -13.200*** -22.775*** 
 (1.254) (1.356) (7.46) 
    
Product Line Depth    
Package size variety by can 1.328**  -18.647*** 
 (0.519)  (6.35) 
Package size variety by can square -0.119*  1.911*** 
 (0.068)  (0.61) 
Package size variety by bottle 5.840***  -10.205*** 
 (0.354)  (2.66) 
Package size variety by bottle square -0.291***  0.422** 
 (0.029)  (0.18) 
Container size variety by can  3.282 31.885*** 
  (2.061) (9.63) 
Container size variety by can square  -0.965* -6.345*** 
  (0.552) (1.90) 
Container size variety by bottle  15.786*** 33.540*** 
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  (1.185) (5.06) 
Container size variety by bottle square  -1.540*** -2.712*** 
  (0.173) (0.51) 
    
Months FE Yes Yes Yes 
DMA FE Yes Yes Yes 
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes 
Beer Type FE Yes Yes Yes 
F-test for price 31.1 15.89 18.1 
F-test for package variety by can 6.56  8.62 
F-test for package variety by bottle 272.36  14.78 
F-test for size variety by can  2.54 10.97 
F-test for size variety by bottle   177.46 44.02 
Observations 48,279 48,279 48,279 
Note: The frequency of observation is 13 four-week blocks annually from 2008 to 2012 from 12 DMAs. The first 100 products 
having the largest market share in a DMA were chosen and the same products were appended from different DMAs. If any product 
is not available in any markets, it is excluded from the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance 
at 1% level, and while ** denotes statistical level at 5%, * denotes statistical level at 10%.  
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Table 4: Estimated Markups by Firms 
Firm Name 
Average 
Markup 
Mass Producers  
  
ANHEUSER BUSCH  1.2323 
MILLER COORS  1.2305 
  
International Brewers  
  
CROWN IMPORTSa 1.2141 
HEINEKEN  1.2098 
MERCHANT DU VINa 1.2049 
  
Craft Brewers  
  
ALASKAN BREW 1.2072 
BOSTON BEER 1.2062 
DESCHUTES BRE. 1.2061 
NEW BELGIUM  1.2056 
FULL SAIL BRE. 1.2055 
SIERRA NEVADA 1.2052 
CRAFT BREWERSb 1.2073  
  
  
Miscellaneousc  
  
C DEAN METROPOULOS 1.2124 
  
NORTH AMERICAN BREWERIES 1.2065 
DIAGEO PLC 1.2051 
  
 
                                a. These companies import beer into the US and are not directly involved with brewing beer. 
  b. Some parent companies of the craft brewers are not identified in our data. 
  c. These companies have acquired multiple breweries and manage their production and marketing 
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Table 5: Percentage Increase in Mean Predicted Market Shares Across All DMAs After a Unit 
Increase in Variety Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Increase in Variety 
Container 
Size Variety 
by Can 
Container Size 
Variety by 
Bottle 
Package Size 
Variety by 
Can 
Package Size 
Variety by 
Bottle 
variety + 1 21.39 -37.85 -0.09 -0.48 
variety + 2 0.95 -42.71 -2.03 -25.65 
variety + 3 -98.66 10.38 -9.71 -19.01 
variety + 4 0 -3.70 5.20 46.66 
variety + 5 0 0 0 13.54 
variety + 6 0 0 0 -4.19 
variety + 7 0 0 0 -13.70 
variety + 8 0 0 0 0 
Note: Column 1 shows percentage increase in predicted market shares, if we increase the size variety by can consecutively. Column 
2 shows percentage increase in predicted market shares, if we increase the size variety by bottle consecutively. Column 3 shows 
percentage increase in predicted market shares, if we increase the package variety by can consecutively. Lastly, column 4 shows 
percentage increase in predicted market shares following a unit increase in package variety by bottle. Mean predicted market shares 
across all DMAs are calculated by averaging brand level predicted market shares across all markets. Brand level predicted market 
shares, on the other hand, are calculated by aggregating product level market shares by brand by market. Values show percentage 
change in predicted market shares between two consecutive increases.  
